- (1.) In the present case, a notice was issued on February 2, 1980 which is Annexure 'G' to this petition, asking the petitioner to participate in a proceedings under Section 7-A of Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (1952 Act). By a letter dated February 19, 1980, being Annexure 'H' to the petition, the petitioners intimated the authority under Section 7-A of the said Act, being the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (RPFC), that a proceedings under Section 19-A of the 1952 Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1988, was pending before the Central Provident Fund Commissioner (CPFC), with regard to the applicability of the Act and the infancy period as well as the question of number of employees employed in the establishment. Therefore, the 7-A proceedings should be stayed. On March 6, 1980, the petitioner submitted its objection contained in annexure 'I' in the said proceedings under Section 7-A and it pointed out its grounds of objection. Few of the grounds related to the objection that the RPFC was not competent to proceed with the proceedings under Section 7-A in respect of the matters which are covered under Section 19-A and should have been referred to CPFC. Therefore, the proceeding should await the decision of the proceeding under Section 19-A. On the ground that the RPFC had been attempting to proceed under Section 7-A, this writ petition was moved and an interim order was obtained staying of the 7A proceedings. However, there was no stay with regard to the proceedings under Section 19-A. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that uptill now the proceedings under Section 19-A has not yet been disposed of or decided. In the circumstances, the notice contained in Annexure 'G' of the proceeding under Section 7-A, should be quashed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner had relied on a decision reported in 1974 (28) FLR 248 (Tip Top Dry Cleaners & Dyers v. Union of India & Another) to which reference would be made at a later stage.
(2.) Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta, Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand points out that in 1988 there has been an amendment by which Section 19-A has since been deleted and Section 7-A has also been amended. By reason of such amendment, RPFC is also competent to decide the dispute, which was to be decided under Section 19-A, in the proceedings under Section 7-A and as such, this writ petition has become infructuous. Now the proceedings can be proceeded with before the RPFC, where all these points can be raised and agitated and be decided. Therefore, nothing remains to be decided in this writ petition.
(3.) I have heard the respective Learned Counsel for both the parties at length. The Question;