JUDGEMENT
Ajit K.Sengupta, J. -
(1.) In this reference under Section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, at the instance of the assessee, the following four questions have been referred to this court :
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that- (a) the disputed claims as on the date of death, for additional compensation in respect of lands at Ramrajatala, Sodepur, Panihati and Sukchar, belonging to the joint Hindu family of the deceased, which vested in the Government of India under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, during the lifetime of the deceased, was property passing on the death of the deceased, and its estimated value was includible in the principal value of the estate of the deceased under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, even when such additional compensation had neither been determined nor paid ; (b) the value of such disputed claim for additional compensation, although neither determined nor paid, on the date of death was not nil ; (c) the assessee was not entitled to any further deduction apart from discounting to cover the risk and hazards of litigation including the possibility of the claim being altogether rejected in respect of lands at Ramrajatala, Sodepur and Panihati even though, on the date Of death, such additional compensation had neither been determined nor paid and there was no certainty whether it was at all payable ; (d) the deduction of one-third granted in respect of Sukchar land to cover the risk of hazards and litigation, etc., was quite fair and reasonable. 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on an interpretation of the agreement with the Port Trust, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the monthly tenancy held by the deceased in the property at Chintamani Dey Ghat Road belonging to the Port Trust should be included as property passing on death and liable to duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the estate duty payable was not liable to be deducted from the total value of the estate and/or otherwise considered as a charge, hazard, clog or jeopardy in determining the principal value of the estate chargeable to estate duty ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that- (a) the ground relating to the claims of the accountable person as to non-inclusion of the lineal descendants' share in the ancestral property owned by the Mitakshara joint Hindu family in the assessment under Section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, does not arise out of the order of the Controller of Estate Duty (Appeals) ? (b) the share of the lineal descendants in the ancestral property owned by the Mitakshara joint Hindu family should be included in the assessment under Section 34(1)(c) read with Section 5 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?"
(2.) The facts from which the first question arises are as under : In determining the principal value of the dutiable estate passing on death, the additional compensation received for acquisition of lands under the Land Acquisition Act at Ramrajatalla, Sodepur, Panihati and Sukchar, belonging to the deceased was included in the estate.
(3.) The property at Ramrajatala vested in the Government of India on and from May 31, 1943, by virtue of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector awarded as compensation a sum of Rs. 2,35,214 which the deceased's Hindu undivided family had received under protest. On appeal, the District Judge awarded an additional compensation of Rs. 11,89,232 by an order dated September 18, 1971. The Government of India, however, preferred an appeal against the award before this court and it is still pending. Meanwhile, the said award and decree of the District Judge was attached by some creditors and was sold in public auction for Rs. 7,50,000 in May, 1972. The deceased, however, died on July 8, 1966, i.e., six years before the award of the District Judge was passed.;