- (1.) The plaintiff in T. S. No. 60 of 1979 made a prayer for partition, for receiver, for accounts etc. The defendants did not dispute the plaintiff's share in the suit property. The learned trial Court granted a decree for partition in preliminary form and also a decree for accounts.
(2.) On the appeal by the plaintiff, the learned first appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree regarding partition but vacated the decree for accounts. 2-A. This second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court. The original Plaintiff Sri Madan Mohan Dey, died during the pendency of the second appeal and his heirs were substituted in his Place in this second appeal.
(3.) The facts now lie within a short compass and mainly undisputed. It is not disputed that the original plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 groups each had half shams in the land, which was the suit property. The plaintiff purchased the undivided half share by a kobala, Ext. 1. The defendants purchased by another kobala, of which Ext. A is the fortified copy. Both groups thus acquired undivided half shares in the suit property. As that point was not disputed by the defendants, we need not focus our attention on that aspect any more. Admittedly, the parties of each group had half shares in the suit property. Certain structures were raised on plot No. 1129. The main bone of contention was with regard to the structures raised on 1129. The defendants claimed that they raised the structures with their own money and the plaintiff had nothing to do. The claim of the original plaintiff was that the structures were raised with contribution made by him also and thus he had asserted his right in the structures too. Now by the two findings of facts of the trial court and of the first appellate court, it has come out and established that the structures belong to the defendants. In view of the situation, the only question is whether the learned trial Court could grant a decree for accounts and whether that decree could be vacated by the learned first appellate court when no appeal was preferred by the defendants.;