Sinha,J. - (1.) In this application we are concerned with the affairs of the Khalsa High School which is situated at 73, Paddapukur Road in the city of Calcutta, the affairs thereof are in the hands of a Managing Committee and it is not disputed that such affairs are subjected to and governed by, the provisions of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1950. In the application, numerous facts have been stated, condemning the administration of the School by the Managing Committee and particularly the conduct of the respondent No. 3, Sri G.S. Grewal, who has been described as the Vice-President of the Managing Committee, in my opinion, however, it is not necessary to go into any such facts. The scope of this application lies in a very small compass and is as follows: The petitioner was employed as an Assistant Teacher in the said School, and at the relevant time the respondent No. 3 was the Vice-President of the Managing Committee. On or about the 3rd August, 1959 the said Vice-President informed the petitioner that he had absented himself from School and his explanation was unconvincing and false, and his services were suspended with effect from 13-7-59 in the interest of the School. Upto now, the petitioner has remained suspended. It is against this order that this application is directed.
(2.) The point taken is that under Rule 33 of the Revised School Code, it is the Managing Committee alone which can suspend a teacher, and that the Vice-President of the School, although a member of the Managing Committee, cannot by himself make such an order. Rule 33 of the Revised School Code runs as follows; "33. A teacher may be suspended by the Committee on grounds of moral turpitude or professional misconduct. In cases where dismissal is subsequently decided upon, the order shall not take effect until the time for appeal to the Arbitration Board has expired and that tribunal has given its decision. In the case of aided schools, suspension on the ground of moral turpitude or professional misconduct shall take effect without delay if the Committee so desires or the Inspector or Inspectress of Schools so directs".
(3.) That the order of suspension dated 3-8-1959 was made by the Vice-President and not by the Managing Committee is not disputed. What happened, however, was that subsequently a resolution was passed by the Managing Committee confirming all the actions of the Vice-President. It is argued that this resolution is not valid because it was not in the agenda and no specific mention was made in the resolution regarding this particular order of suspension. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter presently. Mr. Ray appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 has taken two preliminary points. The first point taken is that the Managing Committee of this private school was not a "public body" and the respondent No. 3 was not a "public officer" discharging public duties or statutory duties. Hence, it is not permissible to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus. The second point taken is that in any event the Revised School Code is not a statutory provision of law. Therefore, a writ in the nature of mandamus does not lie to enforce the same. In Sohanlal v. Union of India, Imam J., said as follows: "Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus is not made against a private individual. Such an order is made against a person directing him to do some particular thing, specified in the order which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, Lord Simond's Edition p. 84). If it had been proved that the Union of India and the appellant had colluded, and the transaction between them was merely colourable, entered into with a view to deprive Jagan Nath of his rights, jurisdiction to issue a writ to or make an order in the nature of mandamus against the appellant might be said to exist in a Court". ;