- (1.) This appeal by the Defendant arises out of a suit instituted by the Plaintiff for ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement of the house. The suit was instituted on January 27, 1949, when the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, hereinafter described as the 1948 Act, was in operation. The suit was decreed by the trial court on September 19, 1949. Against that decision an appeal was preferred by the Defendant. During the pendency of the appeal, the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, hereinafter described as the 1960 Act, came into operation. A preliminary objection was raised before the lower appellate court on behalf of the Defendant Appellant to the effect that the suit, which was instituted by the Plaintiff for eviction of the Defendant on the ground of his bona fide requirement, should be sent on remand for determination of the dispute according to the provisions of Section 12(1)(h) of the 1950 Act. This objection was overruled by the lower appellate court, which came to the conclusion that the case had got to be decided according to the provisions of the repealed statute, namely, the 1948 Act. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed and the decision of the trial court was affirmed.
(2.) The main point that has been canvassed before me on behalf of the Defendant Appellant is whether the present suit is to be decided according to the provisions of the 1948 Act or those of the 1950 Act. It has been argued before me on behalf of the Appellant that the case should be decided according to the provisions of the 1950 Act, inasmuch as that Act was in operation during the pendency of the case in the appellate court.
(3.) On behalf of the Plaintiff Respondent, however, it is contended that the lower courts were right in holding that the case was to be governed according to the provisions of the 1948 Act. Various authorities have been cited before me on behalf of the respective parties. It is unnecessary for me, however, to refer to all of them. The point in controversy can, in my opinion, be settled by reference to certain basic principles, which may be formulated; thus: (i) The ordinary rule of law is that a suit is to be tried by the law as it stood on the date of the institution of the suit unless some new law applies expressly or by necessary intendment. Vide the case of Monmohan Moitra v. Govinda Das Chowdhury,1950 55 CalWN 6. (ii) Where an existing right is likely to be taken away by the operation of an Act, unless there is something which compels the court to give the Act a retrospective effect, a court will not give the Act that effect. Vide the case of S.B. Trading Company, Ltd. v. Satyendra Ch. Sen,1950 54 CalWN 756. (iii) A statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. Vide 31 Halsbury, 516. (iv) The repeal of the 1948 Act has not the effect of divesting the landlord of any right that accrued to him under the repealed Act. Vide the case of S.B. Trading Company, Ltd. v. Satyendra Ch. Sen .;