- (1.) Whether or not the order dated December 27, 2010 issued by the Chairman, Barrackpore Municipality (hereafter the Municipality) holding that the reply of the petitioners (to the notice dated December 8, 2010 calling upon them to show cause why action shall not be initiated for raising unauthorised construction as indicated therein) is devoid of merit and therefore attracts action under section 218 of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993, and the resolution adopted by the Board of Councillors thereof on the next day approving the proposal of the Chairman to take action thereunder could be revised/reviewed by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution is the primary question that calls for an answer on this application filed by the petitioners. Mr. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners, submitted at the outset that the opposite parties being the Municipality, its Board of Councillors and its Chairman acted contrary to fundamental principles of law and justice while forming an opinion that there has been unauthorised construction on the second floor of the building known as 'Promod Bhawan'. According to him, there could be no dispute that all the opposite parties are statutory authorities. It is contended by him that an application under Article 227 would be maintainable against any order passed by a statutory authority if it is found to discharge part of the judicial functions of the State or exercises the inherent judicial powers of the State. Elaborating this point, it has been submitted that an authority constituted by law, here the Board of Councillors, which is required to act quasi -judicially while determining whether there has been unauthorised construction or not attracting action under section 218(1) of the Act ought to be comprehended within 'Tribunal', as referred to in Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be told off at the gate and the present application dismissed.
(2.) It was further contended by him that the word 'Tribunal', both in Article 227 of the Constitution as well as in Article 136 thereof, ought to receive the same meaning. He referred to several decisions of the Supreme Court to buttress his contention that applying the tests laid down therein to determine whether a particular body would constitute a 'Tribunal' within the meaning of Article 136 or not, I ought to hold that the opposite parties are comprehended within the meaning of 'Tribunal' and hence the petitioners are entitled to receive a decision on the merits of the claim raised herein. He placed reliance on the decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi vs. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., 1950 AIR(SC) 188 Province of Bombay vs. Khushal Das S. Advani, 1950 AIR(SC) 222 Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs. P.N. Sharma & Anr., 1965 AIR(SC) 1595 and Manmohan Singh Jaitla vs. Commissioner, Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors., 1985 AIR(SC) 364 in support of his submissions.
(3.) The opposite parties have not been called upon to answer since the decisions cited before me provide complete answer to the point argued and, therefore, I do not consider that their assistance is at all necessary.;