- (1.) This application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against order No.106 dated 16th September, 2010 passed by Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Kolkata in Recovery Proceeding Case No.25 of 2002.
(2.) Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties concerned and also after going through the materials-on-record it could be ascertained that the petitioner by filing an application before the learned Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal prayed for adding him as an intervener to the proceeding namely R.P. Case No.25 of 2002 arising out of O.A No.74 of 1999 for the sake of proper adjudication of the case as also for protecting his interest in respect of flat No.B1 on 1st floor of the premises No.68, VIP Road, Kolkata. It would be manifest from the impugned order dated 16.9.2010 that the learned Recovery Officer directed the petitioner to file relevant document concerning ownership of the flat referred to above but the same having not been filed in Court, the prayer petition was rejected. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned order the petitioner has come up before this Court praying for setting aside the impugned order dated 16th September, 2010 and for obtaining an order for his addition as an intervener to the proceeding for the sake of proper adjudication of the real controversy involved in the proceeding. Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner while making submission drew this Court?s attention to the contents of the impugned order and urged that the learned Recovery Officer despite furnishment of the document concerning the flat occupied by his client, did not consider the matter and rejected the prayer which is untenable and not acceptable in the eye and estimation of law. In support of his contention, he further submitted that the petitioner is in constant possession of the flat in question since date of execution of the agreement dated 12th April, 1994 between the petitioner and Vinayak Construction, a partnership firm represented by its partners Sri Basant Kanoi and Sri Vijay Kumar Jalan. Further, in support of his contention, he drew this Court?s attention to the contents of Para 44 and 45 of the decision United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., 2010 8 SCC 110 and emphatically urged that in a case like the present one, the Hon?ble High Court is having jurisdiction to interfere with the matter in question. In fine, he argued that it is a fit case wherein the impugned order deserves to be set aside for the sake of protection of the interest of the petitioner.
(3.) On the other hand, Mr. Debabrata Das, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party at the beginning of his argument referred to the contents of the impugned order as also the provision laid down in Section 30 and other Sections of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, as also the definition of ?Recovery Officer?, ?Tribunal? etc. and the provisions laid down in Section 20 of the said Act and emphatically contended that the petitioner ignoring the specific provision of law has come up before this Court and as such the revisional application is untenable and the same is liable to be dismissed with cost. Further, in support of his contention, he relied upon the contents of Para 6 of the ruling Punjab National Bank Vs. O.C. Krishnan & Ors., 2001 6 SCC 569 as also the contents of Para 45 and 55 of the ruling United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., 2010 8 SCC 110 and strongly submitted that in a case like the present one, the High Court is not supposed to interfere with such matter inasmuch as the petitioner ignoring the two superior forums has come up before this Court. Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 reads as follows: " (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer made under this Act may, within thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity to the appellant to be heard, and after making 4 such inquiry as it deems fit, confirm, modify or set aside the order made by the Recovery Officer in exercise of his powers under Sections 25 to 28 (both inclusive)?. Further Section 20 of the said Act reads as under: "(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.? Admittedly the impugned order has been passed by Recovery Officer and in accordance with the provisions laid down in Section 30 of the Act, any person aggrieved by any order passed by Recovery Officer made under this Act may apply before the Tribunal. It is the admitted situation that the petitioner did not approach the Tribunal challenging the impugned order passed by the Recovery Officer. Further, it transpires from the contents of Section 20 of the Act that any person aggrieved by any order made by a Tribunal under this Act may prefer an appeal to an ?Appellate Tribunal? having jurisdiction in the matter. From the contents of Para 6 of the aforesaid ruling reported in 2001 Volume 6 Supreme Court Cases it would be made clear that when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions that is to say Hon?ble Apex Court does not encourage the High Court to entertain and interfere with any matter like the present one, although there is indication in 5 the said appeal that the Court may exercise such jurisdiction very cautiously and in a very rare circumstance. Almost similar view is found to have been highlighted in the contents of the Para 45 and 55 of the ruling United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors., 2010 8 SCC 110 of the said ruling speaks as follows: ?It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of the banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.?;