T.Chatterjee, J. - (1.) This appeal is preferred by the Calcutta State Transport Corporation (in short 'Corporation') against the judgment and/or order passed by a learned Judge of this Court in a writ application filed by the Corporation for setting aside the order passed by the 1st Labour Court, West Bengal, dated 30th January, 1997 in Computation Case being No. Comp. 52/94 being annexure 'N' to the writ application and for other incidental reliefs.
(2.) It is not in dispute that in the aforesaid Computation Case the 1st Labour Court, while considering an application of the 'Corporation' under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') directed the 'Corporation' to pay a sum of Rs. 92,920/- being the computation amount of the workman by 31st of March, 1997 after coming to a finding on the basis of an order of a Division Bench of this Court that the workman was entitled to get monetary benefit upto 31st of March, 1990. The matter comes in this fashion. The workman who was a driver of the 'Corporation' was dismissed from service by an order dated 1st of March, 1976. A dispute was raised by the workman against the said order of dismissal which was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. The learned Judge, 3rd Labour Court after adjudicating the dispute between the parties had set aside the order of dismissal and directed the 'Corporation' to reinstate the workman in service and pay all his salaries and service benefits. The workman thereafter applied under section 33-C(2) of the Act for computation of the monetary benefits in which an order was passed holding that the workman was entitled to get a sum of Rs. 73,931/- towards his back wages, Rs. 52,000/- towards the incentive and Rs. 6,016/- towards bonus for the period from March, 1976 to December, 1986. The 'Corporation' in the meantime challenged the aforesaid award passed by the Labour Court in this Court and Mahitosh Majumder, J. (as His Lordship then was) disposed of the writ application by directing the 'Corporation' to allow the workman to join his service without any back wages for the period from 1st of March, 1976 to January 27, 1989. In appeal, a Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeal of the workman. While allowing the appeal, the Division Bench of this Court by its judgment and order directed that after passing of the award by the Labour Court, the workman was not allowed to join by the "Corporation" and for which the workman did not join upto 31st March, 1990 when he attained the age of superannuation. In the said judgment the Division Bench held that the workman would be entitled to all the benefits from 27th of January, 1989 till 31st March, 1990. In the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this Court it was further directed that on computation of the amount for the aforesaid period, the same should be paid to the workman. It was further held that the Corporation within a period of three months from the date of the judgment was directed to send down a computation to the workman as to the amount of money payable to the workman for the period from 27th of January, 1989 till 31st March, 1990. A review application was also filed by the "Corporation" before a Division Bench of this Court pointing out that the date of superannuation on the basis of which the Division Bench had directed computation was on the face of the record not correct as the workman was superannuated on and from 31st May, 1987. Unfortunately the application for review was rejected by the Division Bench on a finding that even if the date of superannuation was wrongly quoted by the Division Bench even then that was not a ground for review of the aforesaid order. After the rejection of the application for review the workman proceeded with an application for computation under section 33-C(2) of the Act. In the said application an objection was taken by the Corporation that the workman was not entitled to get any salary or other emoluments treating, his date of superannuation as on 31st March, 1990 as fixed by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid order as noted hereinearlier when his date of superannuation from the records of the Corporation appeared to be 31st of May, 1987. The Labour Court by the order dated 30th January, 1997 rejected the objection of the Corporation and passed an award in terms of direction given by the Division Bench holding, inter alia, that although from the records it was evident that the date of superannuation of the workman was 31st of May, 1987 but in view of the order passed by the Division Bench, the Labour Court cannot have any jurisdiction to vary the date of superannuation of the workman. This award and/or order passed by the Labour Court was challenged in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. A learned Judge of this Court rejected the writ application, inter alia, holding that since the Division Bench had already fixed the date of superannuation of the workman as on 31st March, 1990, a single bench of this Court cannot have any jurisdiction to vary the said order particularly when an application for review to correct the date of superannuation of the workman was rejected by the Division Bench itself. However, the learned Judge in the impugned order observed the following :-"Ever assuming for argument's sake that the aforesaid finding of the Division Bench in its judgment and order dated 11th of September, 1990 was not correct as the workman was due to retire earlier, such question certainly cannot be reopened as the same having not been modified by a subsequent Division Bench and not having been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court". It is true that against the aforesaid order of the Division Bench and also against the order of the rejection of the review application, Corporation did not take this matter in the higher forum. Under this circumstances we are to consider whether a subsequent Division Bench can modify or vary an order passed by the Division Bench earlier fixing the date of superannuation which, on the face of the record, appears to be incorrect. Before we take up this issue for consideration, let us remind ourselves of the concurrent findings arrived at by the Tribunal as well as by the learned trial Judge that the date of superannuation of the workman from the records was found by the two forums as noted hereinabove to be 31st of May, 1987 and not 31st of March, 1990. Keeping this in mind, let us now consider the question in hand.
(3.) Mr. Bihani appearing for the Corporation submitted before us that the date of superannuation being apparent from such finding of the Labour Court, the trial Court as well as the Labour Court could not have passed an order for payment till 31st March, 1990 inasmuch as the workman had no right to continue beyond the date of superannuation. In support of this contention Mr. Bihani relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kishen v. Union of India, 1997 WBLR (SC) 231 in which the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that even if an employee works beyond the date of superannuation, he has no right to receive salary in respect of such period. Mr. Bihani further contended that even assuming that the earlier Division Bench directed to compute the arrear salaries upto 31st March, 1990 although service records of the workman clearly indicated that the date of superannuation was 31st of May, 1987 which was never challenged by the workman before any appropriate forum, it was open to this Bench to correct the error committed by the earlier Division Bench in saying that the date of superannuation of the workman was 31st of March, 1990. These submissions of Mr. Bihani were, however, disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the workman before us. She contended that the question of maintainability of the claim of the workman in a proceeding under section 33-C(2) of the Act for the purpose of varying the date of superannuation cannot arise at all in view of the fact that in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33-C(2) of the Act it cannot adjudicate any dispute in respect of entitlement and basis of claim of the workman. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. It was contended by the learned counsel for the workman-respondent that under section 33-C(2) of the Act the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is like that of an executing Court. Therefore, the trial Court as well as the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to vary the order of the Division Bench of this Court in a proceeding under section 33-C(2) of the Act and, therefore, no interference can be made with the order impugned in this appeal. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the workman relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak & Anr. 1995(1) SCC 235.;