Amulya Kumar Nandi, J. - (1.) THE Sessions case ended in an acquittal of 21 accused persons charged under Sections 309, 207, 323 read with Sections 149 and 148 I.P.C. The son of one of the victims in the occurrence Mannan Sekh, who eventually succumbed to his injury, has preferred this revisional application.
(2.) THE opposite party contends that while State has not preferred any appeal against the order of acquittal, the petitioner cannot challenge the court's finding. It cannot be laid down as a blanket proposition that a private complainant in a case initiated on a police report can in no circumstances prefer a revision. Ordinarily the court is very reluctant to interfere with the finding of acquittal in a revision preferred by a private complainant. In Satyendra v. : [1975]2SCR743 it was held that where the judgment of the Sessions Judge did not suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court, the setting aside of the acquittal and ordering a retrial is a transgression of the narrow limits of the revisional jurisdiction. In K. Chinna Swamy Reddy. v. State of Andhra Pradesh : [1963]3SCR412 Supreme Court opined that the High Court can set aside an order of acquittal in revision at the instance of a private party where there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Several such instances have been cited by the Supreme Court. Supreme Court further held in Paklapati v. : AIR1975SC1854 that revisional jurisdiction, when invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, ought not to be exercised lightly and that it can be exercised only in exceptional cases where interests of public justice require interference for the correction of manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. It cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has not appreciated the evidence properly. My learned brother Bhattacharya, J in Rinzing Choda v. State opined that the revisional court will not correct mere errors of law or procedure, however, grave or substantial. Even manifest or on a point of law or glaring defect in procedure will not by itself attract revisional jurisdiction unless there is consequential flagrant miscarriage of justice and requirement of public justice demands prevention of such miscarriage. It is not necessary to review various other judgments of the Supreme Court since Bhattacharya, J. has taken notice of the various judgments of the Supreme Court in course of his judgment. We do not overlook that the strict view taken by the Supreme Court earlier that a private complainant cannot wreck vengeance has been mellowed down and modified in course of later Supreme Court judgments. It has been so, as it must be. A straight jacket formula cannot be laid down as to the right or locus standi of a private complainant to prefer a revision in a case instituted on a police report. State may not prefer an appeal for some oblique motive or ulterior purpose despite the fact that the judgment is patently perverse. A perverse rending is that which is not sustainable on the' evidence on record and to which no reasonable man would arrive. This fact cannot weigh very heavily against a private complainant to question the propriety or legality of the judgment. We are inclined to think that, having regard to the changing political and social conditions, a private complainant should be allowed in a prayer case to question the propriety and legality of the judgment where it is found to be absolutely unsupportable and having consequentially occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The petitioner before us is the son of the deceased victim and he being aggrieved on the death of his father has preferred this revision. He should be entitled to prefer the revision, but can not obviously succeed unless he can satisfy the tests laid down above.
(3.) THE petitioner does not invite us to order conviction even if the materials on record warrant it. And as a matter of fact, we cannot do so in view of clear pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy v. : [1963]3SCR412 and in Ramekbal v. : 1967CriLJ1076 . We have to order retrial only if we set aside the order of acquittal.;