Mitra, J. - (1.) The caveator opposite party no. 1 instituted a proceeding under Sec. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 before the Rent Controller, Calcutta being eviction case No. 8/1986 EVC for the eviction of the petitioner from the Premises No. 3E, Charu Avenue, Calcutta - 700033. The case as made out by the caveator opposite party no. 1 in the application under Sec. 29B inter alia, was that originally Jyotindra Nath Mitra, since deceased, was the owner of the disputed premises and on his death, by virtue of a compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 113 of 1968 Smt. Profulla Bala Mitra, the widow of the said deceased Jyotindra Nath Mitra and his four sons, namely Nanda Dulal Mitra, Brojo Dulal Mitra, Shib Dalal Mitra and Murari Dulal Mitra became the owners in respect of l/5th share each in the estate of late Jyotindra Nath Mitra. On the basis of the said compromise decree, 1/5th share of rent of the disputed premises was being realised by the heirs of Brojo Dulal Mitra, since deceased, being Proforma Opposite Party Nos. 8 to 14 to the present civil order and the remaining 4/5th share of the rent was being realised by Nanda Dulal Mitra on his own account and on account of the other co -owners till his death, and on the death of Nanda Dulal Mitra, the said 4/5th share of rent was being realised by Shib Dulal Mitra on his own account and on account of remaining co -owners. The original tenant in respect of the suit premises was Jyotindra Das Gupta and on his death, his two sons and two daughters including the petitioner in the present civil order inherited the said tenancy as his heirs and legal representatives. On the death of Nanda Dulal Mitra, his children including the opposite party no. 1 inherited his share in the suit premises and the caveator opposite party no. 1 thus became one of the co -owners of the disputed premises. The caveator opposite party no. 1 served in the Army of the Union of India as a Medical Officer, and retired from his said service on 31st January, 1934 and as a result of such retirement, he had to vacate the residential quarter allotted by him during his service period, and accordingly, he filed the said application under Sec. 29B as he required the suit premises for his own use and occupation as he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. The petitioner opposed the said application by filing his written statement denying and disputing the allegations made by the caveator opposite party no. 1 in his said application under Sec. 29B. The Rent Controller, by his judgment and order dated 7th September, 1938 allowed the said application of the caveator opposite party no. 1 holding inter alia, that the disputed premises was a joint property as no partition by metes and bounds had been effected amongst the co -owners, and that one co -owner was entitled to bring an action under Sec. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and that the caveator opposite no. 1 had no other reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. The said order of the Rent Controller has been challenged by the petitioner in the present Civil Order inter alia on the grounds that the Rent Controller has acted illegally and with material irregularity in holding that one co -owner of a premises can file an Ejectment proceeding in respect of the entire suit premises without impeding all the other co -owners and since he was paying 1/4th share of the rent to some of the co -owners even after the issuance of the notice to quit under Sec. 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1956, his' tenancy in respect of the suit premises had not been properly terminated and that Sec. 29B is ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and as such the proceeding before the Rent Controller is a nullity.
(2.) So far as Sec. 29B is concerned, it is almost a reproduction of Sec. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act which has been found to be intra vires the Constitution of India by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Kewal Singh v/s. Mt. Lajwanti ( : AIR 1980 SC 161). In Kewal Singh v/s. Mt. Lajwanti (supra), the Supreme Court dealing with question of the validity of Sec. 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act (1958), held inter alia, that the classification made by Sec. 256 is a reasonable classification and cannot be said to be in any way discriminatory or arbitrary. Even though a summary procedure has been evolved, the tenant has been afforded full opportunity to defend his case and oppose the application made by the owner -landlord under the said section, provided, he could disclose good grounds for negativing the case of the landlord. The Supreme Court further held that no litigant has a right to protract the legal proceedings by taking frivolous, irrelevant, irrational or uncalled for pleas. This is what the Sec. seeks to prevent.
(3.) The Supreme Court ultimately observed in the said decision that taking an overall picture of the situation, the circumstances under which the landlord's needs had been classified and the safeguards given by the statute it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that Sec. 253 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (1958) and its subsections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, or that Sec. 253 suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers. In fact Sec. 25B contained valuable and sufficient guidelines which completely exclude the exercise of uncanalised or arbitrary powers by the Rent Controller and the rights of the tenants were also sufficiently protected therein. So far as the provisions of Sec. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act are concerned and I also hold, relying on the ratio of the said decision of the Supreme. Court in Kewal Singh's case (supra), that taking an overall picture of the situation it Cannot be said by any stretch of imagination, that Sec. 29B of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 or its sub -sections are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or that Sec. 29B suffers from the vice of excessive delegation;