- (1.) This revisional application has been filed against the order 17.9.2009 in J. Misc. Case No. 43 of 2004 whereby the learned Court below dismissed the application filed by the defendant/petitioner under section 47 of the CPC.
(2.) The suit for eviction being O.S. No.37 of 1994 was filed by the opposite parties on the ground of reasonable requirement and default. During the course of the proceeding the respondents/plaintiffs and the defendant/petitioner effected a settlement with the stipulation that the defendant would 'vacate the suit premises by December, 2000. It was also stipulated that the defendant would pay the current rent and also the arrear rent to the landlord by December, 2000. THE suit was, accordingly, decreed in terms of the compromise petition.Defendant/petitioner not having delivered the possession in spite of consent decree being passed by the learned Trial Court, the aforesaid decree was put into execution. At the stage of execution the defendant/petitioner came up with the application under section 47 of the CPC, challenging the execution of the decree. THE aforesaid application under section 47 of the CPC was, however, dismissed by the learned Executing Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the defendant/petitioner has filed the instant revisional application under section 227 of the Constitution of India. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Jiban Ratan Chatterjee, learned Senior Advocate, has submitted that in dismissing the application under section 47 of the CPC the learned Executing Court has failed to appreciate the fact that mere consent decree is not sufficient to justify, the eviction of a tenant. It is submitted that unless the landlord satisfies the requirements of the provision of Premises Tenancy Act, ouster of a tenant cannot be effected even through execution of consent or compromise decree.
(3.) Referring to the case of Nai Bahu vs. Lala Ramnarayan and Ors., 1978 AIR(SC) 22, it is submitted that the Apex Court has underlined that if the Court does not find the permissible grounds for eviction disclosed in the pleadings and other materials on the record, no consent or compromise will give jurisdiction to the Court to pass a valid decree of eviction. It is argued that the Apex Court has underscored that the Court is to be satisfied whether a statutory ground for eviction has been pleaded which the tenant has admitted by the compromise. The Court is required to be satisfied about compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of the facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings upto the stage when the compromise is effected. It is further argued that since there was no positive finding that the eviction was required on any of the grounds enumerated in section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the impugned judgement on compromise ought to have been treated as a nullity. The learned Executing Court, it is submitted, has dolefully failed to appreciate.;