- (1.) I have had the benefit of going through the draft judgment of my learned brother, His Lordship the hon'ble Mr. Justice I. P. Mukerji. I record my full agreement as far as the ordering portion is concerned. However, I would like to express my own views having regard to the complexity of the matter. My learned brother has recorded the facts and also the problem posed before this Court. His Lordship has been pleased to note various decisions of the apex court and High Courts cited at the Bar. I have understood in my own way the precise question involved for the disposal of the applications for condonation of delay in preferring appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter Act 1961) in view of the ratio laid down in the case of CCE v. Hongo India P. Ltd., 2009 315 ITR 449 and the legislative amendment after the said judgment was rendered in the Sections 35G and 35H of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter Act 1944) empowering the High Court to condone delay expressly.
(2.) Basically the point is whether the provision of Section 260A of the Act 1961 has expressly or by necessary implication excluded the provisions of Sections 4 - 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as contemplated in Section 29 Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as Act 1963) or not, having regard to the ratio decided in the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court and the impact of the amendment after the said decision as above.
(3.) My learned brother has quoted the relevant portion of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, I need not repeat it. The ratio of the said judgment is that exclusion of Sections 4 - 24 of the Act 1963 either expressly or by necessary implication has to be inferred not with reference to Section 29(2) of the Act 1963 but the relevant provision of the special statute. Several High Courts following the above ratio held that Section 260A of the Act 1961 has excluded the application of Section 5 of the Act 1963.;