- (1.) Mr. Das, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, has assailed the judgment of the learned Tribunal under challenge in this appeal only on one ground. His contention is that the alleged accident allegedly occurred within the premises of a jute factory and since a jute factory has a regulated and restricted entry, it does not come within the definition of a "public place' in terms of section 2(34) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The insurer having issued the policy of insurance in terms of section 147(1)(b) is not liable to satisfy the award passed against the owner of a vehicle if the accident does not secure in a public place. Section 147(1)(b) stipulates that in order to comply with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons specified in the policy to the extent as specified in sub-section (2) of section 147 against any liability which may be incurred by such persons in respect of death or bodily injury etc. as caused by, or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The expression public place has been defined in sub-section (34) of section 2 of the Act which reads as under:- "Section 2(34) : Public place' means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage."
(2.) The argument of Mr. Das that the premises of a factory where the entry is regulated and restricted cannot be called a public place even though may seem attractive in the first impression, yet when one carefully looks into the language used in sub-section (34) of section 2 of the Act and finds that the legislature very clearly intended to include within the ambit and scope of the definition of "public place" even places where entry was either restricted or regulated. The expression 'public place' undoubtedly has been defined to mean a road, street, way, or other place, whether such a road, street, or other place is a thoroughfare or not, but to which public have a right of access. The expression 'whether a thoroughfares or not' does clearly suggest the intention of the legislature that even if a road, street, or a place is not a thoroughfares, it can still be called a public place if the public have a right of access to the same. Undoubtedly the word "thoroughfare" has neither been defined in the Act nor possibly can its definition be traced in any other law relating to the subject. Its general meaning does however suggest that a "thoroughfare" means a place where the public have access at large. The Chambers Dictionary defines the word "thoroughfare" to mean "a passage or way through; a road open at both ends; a public way or street; right of passing through". The New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary defines the word "thoroughfare" as under "a frequented way or course ; especially a road or street through which the public have unobstructed passage; highway;............." Therefore admittedly even if a place is not a 'thoroughfare' as coming in the aforesaid definitions of the word "thoroughfare" and even if the entry therein is either regulated or restricted, section 2(34) still providing that it will come within the definition of "public place" clearly means that the legislature did not want to exclude even such restricted areas from the definition of the expression "public place", provided of course the condition of the public having access to it is also met. When we talk of the public having access to a place or a road or a street which may or may not be a thoroughfare, we are necessarily saying so not to confuse the definition of the word "public" with "public at large" as such. There can be places and areas and there can be roads and streets where people normally residing or working or for doing connected activities have a right of passage, movement and access or right of residence and yet the public at large do not have access to such areas. There can be areas where even though the public at large, not connected with the activities in these areas, would have no access to these areas, yet these may be open to people either residing or working there. Let us take the case of a jute mill which is actually the subject matter of this litigation. A jute mill undoubtedly is spread over a large area and has roads and streets inside its campus where hundreds and thousands of people are working at any point of time. Let us take the case of a large military camp which also has a large area and roads and streets inside the same where at any point of time hundreds and thousands of people may be working. But entry to both these areas can be regulated, restricted or even prohibited for the "public at large", but not for the people either residing there or coming there to work. In the aforesaid two types of areas, or in other areas of similar description people either residing there or going there for work may have to use these areas for one reason or the other. It is these persons which the legislature meant as 'public' when used in the context of section 2(34) in its application to their 'access' to these places, roads or streets whether these are "thoroughfares" or not.
(3.) In the light of the aforesaid discussion therefore, can it be said that if in such an area an accident occurs, the area not being a public place in the strictest sense, because of the disjointed interpretation given to either section 2(34) or section 147(1)(b) of the Act, the Insurance Company would not be liable to indemnify. The answer has to be a firm No, because such an area would decidedly be a public place and any accident occurring therein involving a motor vehicle would attract the liability of the Insurance Company to indemnify. If therefore in such a place an accident occurs, a combined reading of section 147(1)(b) and section 2(34) of the Act suggests that an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the award.;