JUDGEMENT
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(1.) THIS is a revision by the accused against his conviction under section 500, Indian Penal Code and the sentence of a fine of Rs. 200, or in default simple imprisonment for three months, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Narsimhapur, at Camp Durg, in Criminal Case No. 1 of 1964, dated 27-12-1968.
(2.) THE learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the judgment of the trial Court is appealable and consequently this Court ought not to entertain a revision. Attention was invited to section 413, Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down that 'Notwithstanding anything contained, there shall be no appeal by a convicted person in cases in which......a Court of session passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month only, or in which a Court of Session or District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of fine not exceeding fifty rupees only'. As the fine imposed was Rs. 200, an appeal will lie under section 410, Criminal Procedure Code. Where an appeal lies, a revision would be barred, as provided by section 439 (5), Criminal Procedure Code. For this reason, I am of opinion that the present revision cannot be entertained, especially when the remedy of an appeal is open to the petitioner. However, the present revision can as well be treated as an appeal, especially when no question of court-fees is involved, nor is the question of limitation involved. THE petitioner affixed more court-fees than what might be required for an appeal and the revision was filed even before a fortnight of the impugned judgment. For these reasons I treat the present revision as an appeal and direct that the same shall be registered as a memorandum of appeal and numbered accordingly.
Further, there can be no doubt that by publishing the impugned article, the appellant was undoubtedly guilty of the offence of defamation. The very heading indicates the appellant's malice and in the body of the article, irresponsible and baseless allegations are made to the effect that the blackmarketeers have purchased the Collector and the Superintendent of Police of Bhilai. Therefore, on merits the view of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is correct and further I feel that in a case of this type, the sentence of mere fine might as well be considered to be a lenient one, where persons maliciously make such unfounded and baseless allegations against public servants out of a sense of bravado. Thus, if the complaint filed by the respondent be found to be within limitation, the appellant cannot escape his liability for conviction.
However, section 198-B, Criminal Procedure Code provides asunder :-
"Sub-section (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence fal- ing under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (other than the offence of defamation by spoken words) is alleged to have been committed against the President, or the Vice-President, or the Governor or Bajpramukh of a State, or a Minister, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, in respect of his conduct in the dis- charge of his public functions, a Court of Session may take congnizance of such offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor. Sub-section (2)............... Sub-section (3) ...... Sub-section (4)-No Court of session shall take cognizance of an offence under sub-section (1), unless the complaint is made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed."
(3.) THUS, sub-section (4) of the section not only provides for a period of limitation of six months for filing of such a complaint, but also it prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of an offence unless the complaint is filed within six months of the commission of the offence. In the instant case the offence was committed on 9-3-1964 by publishing an article in a local newspaper, known as 'Bhilai Samachar', of which the petitioner is the Editor, Publisher and Printer. Although the prosecution wanted his conviction under sections 500, 501 and 502, Indian Penal Code, the trial Judge found him guilty under section 500, Indian Penal Code only holding that punishing him under sections 501 and 502, Indian Penal Code would be unnecessary in view of his conviction under section 500, Indian Penal Code. Sanction for the prosecution was obtained on 5-9-1964 and the complaint itself was filed by the Public Prosecutor on 17-9-1964. As such, the last date for filing of the complaint according to the sub-section (4) of section 198-B, Criminal Procedure Code, was 9-9-1964. The complaint having been filed on 17-9-1964, would be barred by 8 days. However, the trial Judge held that section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable and as the order-sheet of the trial Judge, dated 15-12-1964, indicates, he thought a sufficient cause was made out and in that view, he extended the time under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. No grievance of this was made in the Trial Court. But for the first time, the question has been raised in the present revision, now ordered to be registered as an appeal, that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to a complaint. In this connection, attention was invited to section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, which speaks of a suit or an appeal or an application. It does not include the word 'complaint'. It may be relevant to reproduce section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which is the relevant provision applicable to the present case, as follows:-
"Sub-section (2)-Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or appli- cation a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
Section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, did not make section 5 and some other sections applicable to suits, appeals or applications. But the 1963 Act makes sections 4 to 24 applicable to all the three categories. The question, therefore, arises whether section 29 (2) of the 1963 Act applies to a complaint, which has been defined by section 4(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as follows:-
" 'complaint' means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate) with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police-officer."
The Limitation Act mentions applications of various kinds, such as, an application for leave to appeal, or in Civil matters, Interlocutory applications, or in Criminal matters, Interlocutory applications seeking some temporary relief or direction. As such, the entire Code of Criminal Procedure draws a distinction between an application and a complaint. A complaint is also distinguished from the report of a police-officer, which is termed as a challan. In view of this scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act, 1963, a complaint, in my opinion, will not fall under the category of a suit, an appeal or an application. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, invited attention to the observations of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, presided over by Leach C. J. and Madhavan Nair J. in Govindaraja Pillai v. Vanchinatham Filial A I R 1989 Mad. 492, wherein the learned Judges had referred to a complaint as petition. In that case the defendant had made an application to the Magistrate against the plaintiff that the plaintiff and some other persons mentioned in the application had suppressed the fact that they had found a treasure-trove. That application was made with a view to action being taken against the plaintiff and others for a Criminal offence. The Division Bench laid down that the machinary of the Criminal Court had been moved. But, even so, that was clearly a complaint made by the defendant against the plaintiff in order, to set in motion the machinery of the Criminal Court. It might be made by way of an application. But all the same, a complaint would be a complaint as defined by section 4 (h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same will have to be distinguished from applications contemplated either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Limitation Act, 1963. The mere fact that the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench just mentioned the word 'petition', which the defendant had sent to the Magistrate, will not mean that the Division Bench laid down the law that a complaint is equivalent to a petition or in other words an application.;