- (1.)APPELLANT plaintiff, a partner of a defunct firm, filed a suit seeking declaration that the house building referred to in the plaint is his personal property and is not liable for attachment and sale for recovery of tax dues to the Slate from the firm and that the order dated 24-1-1986 of the second defendant, Sales Tax, Officer rejecting his objection to the attachment and proposed sale is illegal and void. The suit was opposed by the State relying on the provisions in Section 33 (4) (b) of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, for short, the Act. The trial Court upheld the defence and non-suited the plaintiff. Hence this appeal.
(2.)THE plaintiff appellant was a partnership firm which was assessed for sales tax for the period from 1972-73 to 1979-80 to the extent of Rs. 1,51,780. 00. In recovery proceedings, house in dispute was attached for purposes of sale. The attachment was objected to by the appellant on the basis that the house was his separate acquisition and was not a partnership asset. The trial Court, on the assumption that the building belonged exclusively to the plaintiff appellant, nevertheless held the attachment valid on the strength of the provisions of Section 33 (4) (b) of the Act.
(3.)LEARNED counsel for the appellant placed very strong reliance on the definition of 'dealer' occurring in Section 2 (d) of the Act. 'dealer' means any person who carries on the business of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods directly or otherwise, whether for cash or for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or other valuable consideration. The inclusive definition, inter alia, includes firm. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables Syndicate, AIR 1966 SC 1295 which has been relied on in a later decision in Commissioner of Sales Tax M. P. and Ors. v. Radhakishan and Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 1588. The first decision was under the East Punjab Sales Tax Act, while the later decision was under the Act under consideration in this case. Both the Acts contain a definition of 'dealer' as including firm. In the former case, it was held that since firm was a legal entity, on dissolution it ceased to be a legal entity and there was no provision in the Act empowering the Assessing Authority to assess the dissolved firm for tax due before the dissolution, there cannot be any such assessment. In the latter case, it was held that in view of the inclusive definition of 'dealer', it was only the firm which was liable and not the partner.