- (1.)I have brushed aside objections of the Counsel against hearing the matter today as gross injustice has been caused in this case by letting the matter lie buried for the last 12 years in the heaps of forgotten, if not discarded, records of this court.
(2.)COUNSEL are heard on merits and I proceed to render my decision to dispose of the case finally on merits. Lamentably I have to observe that on 7-9-1983 there was an order passed in this case by this court adjourning the case "sine die" by which the records were consigned to the" deep abyss of inviolable oblivion from which it was difficult to resurrect the matter unless I had reacted to the situation when it came to my notice on perusing the statement of pending cases, on the same being called for, that it was the lone case of 1973, farthest in point of time. However, nothing more need be said on that aspect and at this late stage, I do not like to lay blame at the door of any counsel for the mishap and would conclude merely saying that it is my duty, as early as possible to undo the harm that has ensued to the Course of justice by the long lapse of time.
(3.)SHRI H. D. Gupta, counsel appearing for Non-petitioner No. 2, has strongly urged, m support of the order aforesaid passed in this matter on 7-9-1983, to allow status quo to continue and to await decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as directed in that order. However, Deputy Government Advocate, Shri Roman, appearing for the State (Non-petitioner No. 1), though made to sail in the same boat with Shri H. D. Gupta, has accepted my counsel and agreed to argue the case on merits and I have heard counsel for all parties at length. I did so because I had no doubt at all that this matter need not await decision of their Lordships in an appeal said to have been taken against an order passed by this Court on 1-9-1976, in Civil Revision no. 235/72, which was between the State of Madhya Pradesh and Nandram Naraindas who figured as non-petitioner No. 2 in this matter. The instant petitioners were not parties to those proceedings and the point agitated by their counsel, Shri Dubey assailing the impugned decision did not at all figure in the earlier matter, and no decision thereon was rendered either, by this Court, while disposing of the matter by the order passed on 1-9-1976. True, my attention is drawn to para 16 of the judgment in that case. But the innocuous observations therein which merely hint at the possibility of the State's right to claim priority in the matter of rateable distribution of the decretal amount lying deposited in the executing Court, do not at all touch the question of right of the State to lay such a claim which point is vigorously and forcefully urged before me with great vehemence by Shri Dubey.