Dixit, J. - (1.)THIS revision petition is directed against a decision of the Additional Sessions Judge of Gwalior ordering the prosecution of the applicant Kedarnath under S. 211, I. P. C. The facts are that Kedarnath filed a complaint in the Court of Additional City Magistrate, Lashkar, against Kailashnath and four other persons in respect of offences under Ss. 134, 314, 440, 503 and 505, Gwalior Penal Code. The complaint was dismissed on 15 -7 -1949 and the accused persons were acquitted. While dismissing the complaint the Additional City Magistrate observed that the complaint was "baseless and not proved" (). Thereafter on 18 -10 -1949 Kailashnath presented an application under S. 476, Criminal P. C., in the Court of Additional City Magistrate, Lashkar, for the prosecution of Kedarnath under S. 211, I. P. C.
It did not appear to the Additional City Magistrate that Kedarnath filed the complaint against Kailashnath with intent to cause injury to him or that it was made by Kedarnath with the knowledge that there was no just or lawful ground for the complaint. He, therefore, refused to make a complaint against Kedarnath in respect of an offence under S. 211, I. P. C. Kailashnath then appealed to the Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior. In appeal the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that inasmuch as Kedarnath's complaint against Kailashnath was dismissed on the ground that it was false and made out of enmity, it was "in public interest and in the interest of justice" to prosecute Kedarnath under S. 211, I. P. C. Kedarnath has now preferred this revision petition.

(2.)AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties. I have formed the view that the order of the Additional Sessions Judge of Gwalior directing the prosecution of the applicant, cannot be allowed to stand. Under S. 476, Criminal P. C., the court making the complaint has to be satisfied first that it "appears" that an offence under sub -s. (1), Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) of S. 195, Criminal P. C., has been committed and secondly that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into such offence. On none of these points the Additional Sessions Judge has given any finding in the present case. All that he did, was first to refer to the evidence on which the Additional City Magistrate had in the complaint filed by Kedarnath come to the conclusion that the complaint against Kailashnath was baseless and made out of enmity and, then he proceeded to observe that in these circumstances it was in 'public interest' and in the interest of justice to prosecute Kedarnath under S. 211, I. P. C. The Additional Sessions Judge said:
The reasons referred to by the learned Sessions Judge are that firstly in the proceedings instituted by Kedarnath, one witness Pirkhan only deposed to the presence of one accused, namely, Bhawani Shankar; that secondly another witness' Ramdayal did not say anything about Kailashnath's presence at the time of the alleged occurrence ; and that thirdly both Kailashnath and Kedarnath admit that there was enmity between them on account of the rent of a house which Kailashnath had taken on rent from Kedarnath. Now the Additional City Magistrate while acquitting Kailashnath or other accused persons nowhere said in his judgment that the complaint against Kailashnath was "false" or that he i.e., Kailashnath was not present at the time of the occurrence alleged by Kedarnath.

He only said that the complaint was baseless and not proved and that it appeared that the accused persons other than Bhawani Shankar had been implicated on account of enmity. Now it seems to me that merely because, of the three witnesses examined by Kedarnath, in support of his complaint, one said that only Bhawani Shankar was present at the time of the occurrence and the other deposed that besides Bhawani Shankar there were other persons also but he could not recognize them, it cannot be said that the complaint was prima facie false and made by Kedarnath with the knowledge that there was no just or lawful ground for any charge against Kailashnath and with intent to cause injury to him. Nor can it be said that as Kedarnath and Kailashnath were admittedly not on good terms, the complaint must have been a false one and one preferred with intent to cause injury to Kailashnath and without any just and lawful cause.

The sum and substance of the order of the Additional City Magistrate acquitting Kailashnath and others is that the complaint made by Kedarnath was not proved and had no basis in the evidence "produced". This is far from saying that the complaint was false or that it was made by the complainant with the knowledge that there was no just or lawful ground for the accusations preferred and with intent to cause injury to the accused. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was, therefore, not justified in holding that the Additional City Magistrate found Kedarnath's complaint "false" and much less in coming tot the conclusion that as the complaint was false, it was necessary in "public" interest and in the interest of justice to prosecute Kedarnath under S. 211, I. P. C. I do not know from where the Additional Sessions Judge has acquired the notion that under S. 476 a prosecution can be ordered when it is in "public interest". The section speaks of expediency in relation to interest of justice and not of public interest. The expression "it is expedient in the interest of justice" means to attain or do what is right and proper in the circumstances. As used in S. 476, Criminal P. C., it does not mean that the prosecution should be ordered just to satisfy the private grudge of a party.

This is clear from the amendment made in 1923 to S. 195, Criminal P. C., whereby private persons were stopped from obtaining sanction as a means of wrecking vengeance and the courts were given full discretion in deciding whether any prosecution was necessary or not. Regard being had to the fact that the material on record does not make it appear that an offence under S. 211 has been committed by the applicant or show that there is a reasonable probability of satisfactory evidence forthcoming after a lapse of nearly six years to secure the conviction of Kedarnath, I do not think it would be expedient in the interest of justice to order the prosecution of the applicant.

For the above reasons this revision petition, is accepted and the order dated 12 -3 -1954 of the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside.

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