Shinde, C.J. - (1.)THIS is a petition for the issue of a writ of 'habeas Corpus' under Art. 228 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner alleged in his petition 'inter alia' that the grounds of detention are false, vague, and 'mala fide'. Para 5 of the petition specifically states that the ground No. 5 of the grounds of detention being the subject matter of a criminal prosecution, cannot be made a ground of detention. Para 6 of the petition avers -hat although the petitioner has been acquitted of the charge of harbouring offenders as is clear Tom the decision in File No. 1 of 1953 of the Court of the Special Magistrate, District Bhind & Morena, & Pile No. 155 of 1952 of the court of the Sub -Divisional Magistrate. Morena, he is still being harassed by the non -petitioners. The petitioner, therefore, prays for the issue of a writ of 'habeas corpus' directing the release of the petitioner torn illegal custody.
(2.)MR . Dey who appears for the petitioner has pressed before us three grounds. His first contention is that although the petitioner has been acquitted of the charge of harbouring offenders, he has been detained on the same ground. It is clear from a perusal of the return that the prosecution mentioned in paragraph 6 of the petition, namely, File No, 1 of 1953 of the court of the Special Magistrate, District Bhind and Morena, and File 155 of 1952 of the court of Sub -divisional Magistrate, Morena, refers to the petitioner's activities prior to the year 1953. These activities have not been considered by the detaining authority for the passing of the detention order. Consequently this contention has no force. The second contention put forward by Mr. Dey is that ground No. 5 being the subject matter of criminal prosecution, cannot be made a ground of detention. In support of this Mr. Dey referred us to 'Labaram Deka v. The State',, AIR 1951 Ass 43 (A). In that case it was held that when what is alleged against the accused in the grounds of detention is the subject of a pending prosecution, the order of detention is improper. As the matter is still to be proved by the prosecution in the pending case, the decision of the court cannot be anticipated. But this case has been distinguished in 'Krishna Kanta v. The State', AIR 1953 Ass 63 (B). It was held in this case that as the order did not rest on this ground (the ground which is sub -judice) alone, the detention could not be held to be illegal, even if there was any case pending against the person arising out of any one transaction.
, AIR 1951 Ass 43 (A), therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner. Ground No. 5 may be the subject matter of a criminal prosecution. But there are as of any as 12 grounds. If one of them be a subject matter of the prosecution, that does not make the order of detention illegal. If it be proved that the detention was resorted to for a collateral purpose, then it would be a different matter. If for instance, the object of detention be proved to he to deprive the detenu of his rights and safeguards under the Criminal Procedure Code and to carry on an investigation without the supervision of the court then it may be said that the detention is 'mala fide'. But that is not the case in the present petition.

The question has to be approached and answered in each case on the footing whether the order of detention in view of the pending prosecution is 'bona fide' or not. For answering the question the uncontroverted fact may have to be considered and the test will be whether the order of detention is for the purpose it purports to be or really for any ulterior or collateral purpose. ('Vide Maledath Bhasathan v. Commr. of Police' : AIR 1950 Bom 202 (FB) (C), and 'Dayanand Modi v. State of Bihar,' : AIR 1951 Pat 47 (D).) The same view has been taken by the Hyderabad High Court in 'Raj Bahadur v. State', AIR 1953 Hyd 277 (E). In this case it has not been shown that the order of detention has been passed for any ulterior purpose. A perusal of the grounds of detention clearly indicates that the detaining authority was actuated by a motive to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. This contention, therefore, has no substance.

(3.)THE third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of the detaining authority is 'mala fide'. In support of this contention the learned counsel has put forward two grounds. One is that with regards to the grounds Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of the grounds of detention security proceedings were taken. But for want of evidence the petitioner was discharged. Discharge of the petitioner does not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the action of the detaining authority is 'mala fide'. It is well known that unless satisfactory evidence is produced, the court will not hold the charge proved.
In Bhind and Morena districts where people have been terrorized by the dacoits it is extremely difficult to produce evidence. Consequently if evidence docs not come forward, and the petitioner is discharged it does not follow that his activities are not prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. In 'Gajanan Krishna v. Emperor', AIR 1915 Bom 533 (F), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that it is a fallacy to say that the right to prosecute a person under the ordinary criminal law and the right to detain him under the Defence of India Rules or the Ordinance are mutually exclusive. If a person who is really dangerous to public safety and maintenance of public order, commits an offence, Government would certainly be justified to prosecute him for the offence first and if for want of sufficient evidence, the prosecution fails, it would nonetheless be necessary to keep him in detention for the sake of public safety and maintenance of public order. The standard of evidence required for conviction is different from that required for a reasonable satisfaction of the necessity for detention in the interest of public safety or maintenance of public order For conviction, the court teas to be convinced of the guilt of the accused and the benefit of a reasonable doubt goes to the accused. But for the purpose of detention it is enough if the Government or any officer duly empowered is reasonably satisfied of the necessity of his detention, and there can be no benefit of doubt, since the public safety and maintenance of public order are the paramount concern of Government, during the times of emergency. The same view was taken in 'Raman Lal Rathi v. Commr. of Police', : AIR 1952 Cal 26 (G). Their -Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows:

The central purpose of the Preventive Detention Act is preventive detention justified, by national security and maintenance of public order and essential supplier, and services and its purpose is not criminal conviction justified by legal evidence and by existing laws relating to crimes and offences. The consideration of the Court and the consideration of the Government are in this context desperate and do not belong to the same realms of scrutiny. The principle of 'autrefois acquit' under S. 403, Criminal P. C. has no application because the satisfaction of the Government under the Preventive Detention Act is not a 'trial'. Their Lordships further observed:

An order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act is not illegal merely because it nullifies a previous order of discharge on acquittal by a court in a criminal or quasi -criminal case.

There is no reason why acquittal must necessarily mean that the acquitted person nevertheless cannot be acting in a manner prejudicial to national security or maintenance of essential supplies and services as mentioned in S. 3, Preventive Detention Act, and why if the Government is satisfied on that account it cannot in such a case come to the conclusion that it is necessary to detain him. A person can be detained under the Preventive Detention Act even if he has not committed an offence proved under the Penal Code or under any other Act. It is entirely erroneous to think that the ordinary criminal laws of the country and the Preventive Detention Act are substitutes for each other. If anything, they are complementary.

The same view was taken in 'Jangir Singh v. State of Pepsu',, AIR 1953 Pepsu 190 (H). In - - 'Subodh Kumar Singh v. The State', : AIR 1951 Pat 68 (I), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court also took the same view. There is thus ample authority in support of the proposition that even after the acquittal of the detenu in a regular criminal trial, Government can proceed to take action under the Preventive Detention Act. The action under the Preventive Detention Act after the acquittal does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the action of the Government is 'mala fide'.

;