- (1.)THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.)THE material facts giving rise to this petition, briefly, are as follows: The petitioner, an employee of the Western Railway, was at the material time working on the post of Loco Driver at Ratlam. On 17th April, 1968, a goods train 768-Up going towards Bombay left Meghnagar railway station at 0. 20 hours and stopped outside the home signal of Anas B Cabin, as the passenger train 55 Dn. coming from the opposite direction was to pass first towards Ratlam. At that time, another goods train 846-Up coming from Ratlam dashed against 768-Up goods train. At the time of the accident, the petitioner was the driver of goods train 846-Up. He was suspended on 18th April, 1968 and was prosecuted for having committed offences punishable under Section 101 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. The charges framed against the petitioner were as follows: First: That you, on or about 17th April, 1968, at Meghnagar, allowed train No. 846-UPDiesei Goods Train to leave a block station without permission to approach the break station and thus contravened General Rule 237 (A) and (b) and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 101 of the Indian Railways Act. Secondly: That on the same day and at Anas did not pay attention and did not obey the signals and thus contravened General Rule 76 (a) and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 101 of Indian Railways Act. Thirdly: That you, on or about the same day and during the same transaction at Anas, allowed Train No. 846-Up Diesel Goods Train the outer home signal when it was on and without having received a written authority from the Station Master to proceed pass such signal in contravention of General Rule 78 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 101 of the Indian Railways Act. Fourthly: That you, on or about the same day at Anas, allowed Diesel Goods Train No. 846 to pass a starter when it was on, without the permission of Station Master in contravention of General Rule 79 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 101 of Indian Railways Act. Fifthly: That on or about the same day at Anas, you failed to keep a good lookout when the train 846-Up was in motion and thus contravened General Rule 122 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 101 of the Indian Railways Act. Sixthly: That you, on or about the same day and during the course of the same transaction at Anas, caused the death of Rajsingh, Chiman, Bijia, Ambalal, Ditia, Mohammad Usman, Tikamsingh, Perthaji, Kantichandra, Ramkishan, Badri and Sheikh Rasool, by doing a rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide to wit by driving 846-Up Diesel R. J. Divekar vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (08. 12. 1983 -MPHC) Page 3 of 11 Goods Train rashly and negligently, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court. The petitioner was convicted by the trial Court and he was removed from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against his conviction was dismissed but in the revision petition preferred by the petitioner the High Court, by its judgments dated 16th November, 1978, found that the prosecution has failed to prove any charge against the petitioner and the petitioner was, therefore, acquitted of the offences charged with. As the conviction of the petitioner was set aside, he was reinstated by the respondents on 17th February, 1979 but on the same day, he was again suspended and a departmental enquiry was instituted against him for having caused the aforesaid accident by contravening Rules 76 (a), 79, 98 (a) and (b) and 122 of the Rules. The petitioner objected to the enquiry on the ground that the charges leveled against the petitioner in the domestic enquiry were substantially the same as were framed against him in the criminal case, in which he was ultimately acquitted. The enquiry, however, proceeded, overruling the objections of the petitioner and when the petitioner found that his suspension had virtually continued for more than 14 years, he sent a letter by post to Chief Justice of India, which was forwarded to the Registry at Jabalpur and placed before the Chief Justice, who passed the following order on 6th May, 1982: Call for a copy of the judgment in Criminal Revision No. 75 of 1976, decided on 16th November 1978 from Indore Bench. In case it is found that the applicant was acquitted in that revision by the High Court, treat the application addressed to the Chief Justice of India and forwarded by the Principal Private Secretary to the High Court, as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, provide a counsel from the panel to the petitioner, dispense with court-fee and other formalities and list the case in motion before the appropriate Bench for orders. Inform the petitioner thereafter. Sd/- CHIEF JUSTICE 6th May, 1982. The petition was admitted and on 12th August, 1983, it was directed that the petition be sent to the Bench at Indore for disposal as the case arose from Ratlam. The case was accordingly fixed for final hearing on 25th November, 1983 when the counsel for the Railway prayed for a short adjournment and the case was fixed for hearing on 1st December, 1983. The case was accordingly heard on 1st December, 1983 and at the request of the counsel for the Railway, the hearing was further adjourned to 3rd December, 1983, on which date, we were informed that on 1st December, 1983, the disciplinary authority had passed an order removing the petitioner from service. A copy of the order was also filed by the learned Counsel for the respondents.
(3.)THE petitioner was not represented by a counsel and he desired to argue in person. His main contention was that as in Criminal Revision No. 75 of 1976, the High Court had found that the charges leveled against him were not proved, the departmental enquiry instituted against him into the same charges and the consequent order passed in that enquiry, deserved to be quashed. On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the charges in the departmental enquiry were not the same as were framed in the criminal case instituted against the petitioner and that the acquittal of the petitioner was, therefore, no bar to the holding of a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. It was also contended that even if the charges were the same, acquittal of the petitioner did not bar holding of a departmental enquiry.