- (1.)THIS is an appeal by the decree-holder in an execution case against the defendant judgment-debtor who has got a private settlement certified by the executing Court. The facts are all common ground and the only ground on which the decree-holder has come is that the prayer for certification having been made late it should be ignored and he should be permitted to levy the decretal amount over again, possibly leaving it to the judgment-debtor to pay a second time and then to recover it from the decree-holder by a separate suit.
(2.)THE facts of the case necessary for our purpose are the following: One Pedhanna Chettier of Coimbatore in the Tamilnad State obtained an ex-parte decree against the present respondents Mulchand and others a joint family doing business at Indore. THE decretal amount on the face of it was Rs. 5,750 but as will presently appear it was later on reduced by agreement between the parties to Rs. 2,801. THE decree was transferred for execution to Indore. It turned out that the decree holder of Coimbatore had an attorney at Indore working for him and looking after his interests. That attorney entered into an agreement with the judgment-debtors on 6-7-1965. THE competency of this attorney to enter into such an agreement was questioned by the decree- holder ; but the executing Court has for sufficient reasons held that the attorney was competent; in fact the terms of the agreement were subsequently accepted by the principal. Thus there is no doubt that this agreement was binding on him. THE main lines of the agreement were; First, reduction, subject to one condition to be set out presently, of the claim to Rs. 2,801; second, that the judgment-debtors should pay the decree-holder Rs. 1,000 before 23-12-1966 on failure of which the agreement would stand cancelled ; third, after that date the balance of Rs. 1,800 to be paid in monthly instalments of Rs. 50 and thus liquidated in course of three years; fourth, in the event of four successive defaults in the payment of instalments the entire outstanding amount, that is the amount outstanding out of Rs. 2,801 would become leviable in lump. Now this is a payment or adjustment in terms of Order 21, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code and has in the eyes of law to be certified. Actually the party initially responsible for certifying is the decree-holder; but where the decree- holder out of negligence or with any ulterior purpose fails to do so the judgment-debtor may also take action. This is clear from the wording of the two sub rules:
"THE decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree and the Court shall record the same accordingly."
THE judgment-debtor also "may inform the Court of such payment or adjustment" Whereupon the Court shall issue notice to the decree-holder to show cause why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified and in the absence of sufficient cause the Court shall record the same. THE third sub-rule provides that an uncertified or unrecorded payment or adjustment shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree.
In this case the decree-holder did not certify the satisfaction. The judgment-debtor did so on 29-11-1966 after making a deposit of Rs. 1,000. When noticed about it the decree-holder admitted the fact of such a deposit but pleaded that for one thing, his agent was not competent to enter into an arrangement and for another, the judgment-debtor's petition was filed more than 30 days after the adjustment and was accordingly time-barred. It was urged by the decree-holder that it should be ignored and he should be permitted to levy the amount mentioned in his decree.

As a matter of detail it may be noted even here that it is common ground that the monthly instalments of Rs. 50 have been kept up and the entire amount of Rs. 2,800 has been paid. The decree-holder, however, asserts that there had been defaults though it is difficult to see what difference it would make after so many years, because the default would only enable him to collect the entire amount outstanding in one lump and by now the entire amount has been paid up. Any way, the decision on any controversy or difference in this regard can be left to the executing Court

(3.)THE judgment-debtor's answer is that starting point for limitation of 30 days is not the date of compromise, that is, 6-7-1965 but the last date for the first payment of Rs. 1,000. In fact the agreement itself mentions-
"Till the payment of Rs. 1,000 is made by 26-12-1966 we will not be able to place this compromise before the Court. Only then will the execution be deemed satisfied."
Whether we start limitation from that date, that is, 26-12-1966 or the date of the actual payment of Rs. 1,000 which was 29-11-1966 the petition of the later date was in time. In fact the judgment-debtor had made the deposit and given the petition forthwith.
The contention made on behalf of the decree-holder is that the law having provided for a period of limitation it is not open to the litigants by their own conduct to change it. If by this is meant that where the law has given a particular term as limitation the parties cannot change it to some other term unless the law itself expressly enables them to do so, this is obvious. But the starting point of limitation is not a point of law. It is one of fact. And it can always be changed by the conduct of the parties. For example, here the decree-holder contends that it should start on 6-7-1965 while the judgment- debtor contends that it should start on 29-11-1966. Whatever the merits of these conflicting contentions it cannot be called an attempt to change the limitation period. The agreement itself was not to come into operation till a particular contingency. In fact the parties themselves have bound themselves not to move the Court in the matter of certification till this contingency occurs. Therefore it is obvious that limitation starts on the date of the actual payment of the first instalment of Rs. 1,000.