- (1.)THIS is an appeal by a tenant against whom a decree for eviction has been passed under section 12(1)(c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act on the ground that prior to the institution of the suit the tenant denied the title of the landlord and thus committed an act which was likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.
(2.)LEARNED counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant merely denied the derivative title of the plaintiff which did not amount to denial of the landlord's title, that mere denial of title cannot be a ground for eviction under section 12 (1) (c), and that in the present case it has not been established nor has it been pleaded that the defendant's denial of the plaintiff's title is likely to affect him adversely or substantially, therefore, no decree for eviction could be passed on the ground mentioned in section 12 (1) (c) of the Act.
Section 12 (1) (c) of the Act reads as follows:

"12 (1) (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein."

This section was construed by A. P. Sen J. in Gulam Mohammad v. Poonam Chand(1969 MPLJ 843) and it was held that the third clause of section 12 (1) (c) which reads "has done any act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord", is wide enough to include acts of denial of the landlord's title. This view was confirmed by a Division Bench in Pandit Ramjiial v. Vijai Kumar(1976 MPLJ 50). In Gulam Mohammad's case A. P. Sen J. also observed that ''a denial of the landlord's title undoubtedly affects him adversely, and it also affects him substantially". But by reading the case as a whole I do not think that the learned Judge meant to hold that every denial of landlord's title is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. Take a case where a tenant denies the title of the landlord under a mistake and soon thereafter having discovered his mistake intimates the landlord that his earlier denial of the title was under a mistake and that he accepts him as his landlord. Take another case where the tenant bona fide, to protect his interest, refuses to recognise any one of the rival heirs of the original landlord as his landlord until their rival claims are settled or decided. I do not think that in the examples that I have given it would be possible to say that the denial of title is such which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord. The true legal position appears to be that in every ease it will have to be seen whether in the particular facts of that case denial of title by the tenant is such that it is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.

(3.)THE argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant merely denied the derivative title of the plaintiff is not factually correct. It is now no longer in dispute that the defendant was let in as a tenant by one Abdul Gani who was originally the owner of the accommodation. Abdul Gani sold the house to the plaintiff on August 14, 1968. On August 21, 1968, the defendant issued a notice addressed to Pritamsingh, who is husband of the plaintiff, and to one Jumma. In that notice the defendant stated that he was tenant of Jumma who had entered into an agreement with him for selling the house for Rs. 9,000. It was also stated therein that Jumma had promised to execute the sale-deed by Diwali 1968. It was further stated that Pritamsingh and Jumma were called upon to execute and register a sale-deed in favour of the defendant, otherwise a suit would be instituted against them for that purpose. It will be seen that in this notice the defendant set up a title in Jumma who, as is now accepted, had nothing to do with the house and also pleaded an agreement for sale of the house in his favour from Jumma. THE notice Ex. D-2 was replied by Abdul Gani and Jumma and this reply is Ex.P-6. In Ex. P-6 it was made clear that the defendant was a tenant of Abdul Gani and not of Jumma and that Abdul Gani had sold house to the plaintiff. It was also stated that the plea of the defendant that there was an agreement for sale in his favour was false. THE defendant was also requested to pay rent to the plaintiff. THEreafter, the plaintiff issued a notice on March 14, 1969, which is Ex. D-1. In this notice the plaintiff stated that she had purchased the house from Abdul Gani and that the defendant was in arrears of rent from August 14, 1968. THE defendant's tenancy was terminated and he was asked to vacate and to pay the arrears of rent. In reply to this notice the defendant by Ex. D-3 dated April 5, 1969, again took the stand that he was tenant of Jumma who was the owner of the house and that Jumma had agreed to sell the house to him by Diwali 1968. THE plaintiff issued another notice Ex. P-1 on December 24, 1969, again demanding arrears of rent and asking the defendant to vacate. This notice was replied by the defendant by sending Ex. P-3, on January 13, 1970. In this reply again the defendant reiterated the stand that Jumma was the owner of the house and that Jumma had promised to sell the house to him. THE plaintiff's title and her right to recover rent were denied. It will be seen that in the notices Exs. D-2, D-3 and P-3 the defendant not only denied the derivative title of the plaintiff, but set up a title in a third person, namely, Jumma, who had nothing to do with the house. THE defendant did not even accept that Abdul Gani was his landlord. In the circumstances, the denial was a complete denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant as also between Abdul Gani (plaintiff's predecessor) and the defendant.
Learned counsel for the appellant cited certain authorities as to what is a disclaimer of title under the law of landlord and tenant which enables a landlord to forfeit the tenancy. In my opinion, those cases are not relevant, for the question that arises under section 12 (1) (c) is not whether the denial of title by the tenant, which is proved in the instant case, amounts to disclaimer giving rise to forfeiture, but whether the denial of title is such that it is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord.