- (1.) This is a revision petition under section 91 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act XXI of 1950 against an appellate order of the District Collector, Khammameth, passed under section 92 of the Act on appeal to him against an order passed by the Tenancy Tribunal at Yellandu. When the appeal came on for hearing on the first occasion, the petitioner who was the appellant, applied for time for producing some documents which would show that the respondent had more than a family holding. Time was accordingly granted. But on the date to which the appeal stood posted for hearing thereafter the appellant did not turn up. The Collector however considered the appeal on its merits and dismissed it. In this revision petition it is contended that the Collector should have dismissed the appeal for default so as to have enabled the petitioner to apply'for restoration of the appeal and that he had no jurisdiction to dismiss it on the merits. I cannot agree with this contention. It seems to me that the administrative tribunals created under this Act just like similar tribunals created under any other statute have to decide any case before them upon the merits, in accordance with the provisions of the Act whether or not the parties interested appear at the hearing, in the absence of a specific statutory authorization to refuse to decide it. The parties may no doubt have the right to be heard but are not, as under the Civil Procedure Code under a duty to be present. Therefore, if a party does not appear, a statutory tribunal must, in my judgment, dispose of the matter on the merits, unless the specific provisions in the Civil Procedure Code relating to the dismissal for default such as Order IX, rule 9 and Order XLI, rule 10, are made applicable by the statute or similar provisions are inserted in it.
(2.) By sub-section (1) of section 89 of the Act with which I am now concerned it is enacted that, "the provisions of sections 149 and 150 of the Land Revenue Act shall apply to the recording of evidence and of decisions at inquiries held under this Act", and by sub-section (2), that, "for the purposes of any such inquiry the Tahsildar. Tribunal and Collector may exercise all or any of the powers conferred on civil Courts by the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, including the power to award costs."
(3.) This is followed by section 92 which enables the appellate and revisional authorities to exercise all the powers conferred on the original authority. I do not read the second sub-section of section 89 in the way in which Mr. Madhava Rao wants me to read it ; that is to say, as comprehending among the powers conferred thereby a 'power' of dismissal for default. The powers conferred by this section are only powers, it seems to me, in aid of the duty to proceed with the enquiry ; note the words " for the purposes of any such inquiry". In my judgment, the idea underlying these words is that the Tahsildar, Tribunal and Collector should have all the powers necessary for the purpose of carrying on the enquiry successfully such as the power to issue summons, to direct discovery, to ask a person to produce a document, to impose penalties" for non-compliance with such orders, etc.;