V RAMA DEVI Vs. L NIRMALA DEVI
LAWS(APH)-1992-7-27
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Decided on July 28,1992

V.RAMA DEVI Appellant
VERSUS
L.NIRMALA DEVI Respondents




JUDGEMENT

- (1.)This petition is directed to call for the records relating to Cr.No.200/90 on the file of 6th Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and to quash the same. The petitioners filed this criminal petition alleging as follows: The first respondent is the wife of late Sri Yadava Reddy, brother of the first petitioner. Since Yadava Reddy lost his father while he was young, the petitioners not only brought up Yadava Reddy but helped him in his education and got him educated. Yadava Reddy was educated upto graduation and also got diploma in Pharmacy and for the entire education the petitioner helped Yadava Reddy. Later Yadava Reddy got employment in Iraq. In connection with his education, Yadava Reddy raised loans to the tune of about Rs.6,000/- in Torrur village and about Rs.25,000/- was spent by the petitioner on his education. In view of that, between the years 1982 and 1983 Yadava Reddy sent monies from Iraq to discharge the loans contracted by him in the village and also to repay the loans borrowed by him from the petitioners. In the year 1988 Yadava Reddy visited India and having developed illness died on November 19,1988 suddenly. All along, the first respondent who is the widow of late Yadava Reddy bore ill-will against the petitioners. At the instance of the first respondent Yadava Reddy issued a notice to the petitioners regarding the monies sent by him from Iraq. Later with a view to black mail the peti tioners the first respondent filed a private complaint under Sections 406 and 420 I.P.C. against the petitioners before the VI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad making false allegations and accusations. The same was referred to the police by the learned Magistrate and the police registered the same as Cr.No.200/90 and took up investigation in the case. Since the dispute is one of civil nature, it is not in the interest of justice to allow the police to further investigate into Crime No.200/90. Having filed a criminal case as stated supra on September 22,1990, the first respondent filed O.S. No.878/90 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for the recovery of the amounts and other reliefs. Under these circumstances allowing Cr.No.200/90 to be further investigated amounts to nothing but abuse of the process of the Court and further alleging that to secure ends of justice, it is prayed for further proceedings in Cr.No.200/90 be quashed.
(2.)The learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the matter is at the stage of crime, Sec.482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. To substantiate his contention, the learned Public Prosecutor relies upon Emperor vs. Nazir Ahmad and Kurukshetra University vs. State of Harynna.
(3.)In Emperor vs. Nazir Ahmad the question that arose for consideration is succinctly as follows:
" The question raised is stated, and their Lordships think correctly stated, in the case presented by the respondent to be whether the High Court had power, under Sec.561-A Criminal Procedure Code to quash all proceedings taken in pursuance of two First Information Reports." (vide the opening para at page 19). The said question was answered as follows: "In their Lordships' opinion however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the Court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of Justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combinations of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate to case when moved under Sec.491 Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Sec.561-A has given incleased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed and still more if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and for this reason Newsam J., may well have decided rightly in AIR 1938 Mad. 129 (M.M.S.T. Chidambaram vs. Shanmugam Pilial). But that is not this case. In the present case the police have under Secs. 154 and 156 Criminal Procedure Code a statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence without requiring the sanction of the Court, and to that extent the case resembles 44 Cal. 535 (Chhatrapat Singh Dugar vs. Kharag Singh Lachmiram) in which as the High Court has pointed out their Lordships Board expressed the view that to dismiss an application on the ground that, it would be an abuse of the powers of me Court might be, to act on treacherous grounds."
This matter squarely came up for consideration in a Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana (2 supra). The facts of the said case are: The Kurukshetra University which is one of the appellants filed First Information Report through its warden in regard to an incident which is alleged to have taken place on the intervening night of 25/26th September, 1975 in one of the University hostels. Acting on the said report the police registered a case under Sec.442 and 452 Cr.P.C. against one Vinaya Kumar, the second respondent before the Supreme Court. But even before the investigation could be done by the police, Vinaya Kumar filed a petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana praying that the First Information Report be quashed. The Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed the same and when the University asked for a review, the review application was dismissed and consequently the University approached the Supreme Court and dealing with the matter the Supreme Court has pleased to observe as follows:
"It surprises us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a First Information Report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any Court in pursuance of the F.I.R. It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases."
Thus these two decisions in unequivocal terms lays down that the powers under Sec.482 (which corresponds to Sec.561-A in the old Code) cannot be invoked when the matter is pending at the crime stage.
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