- (1.) THE present respondent had filed suit for recovery of RS.5,200.00 towards arrears of rent, damages and sought possession of the suit house. It is the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the present appellant/defendant was the tenant. The tenant was in arrears of rent. The plaintiff determined the tenancy vide notice which was served upon the defendant on 5th April, 1982. The suit came to be filed by the plaintiff on 3rd November, 1982. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby the defendant filed an appeal. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The defendant has assailed the said concurrent findings in the present second appeal.
(2.) THE present second appeal has been admitted on 21-8-1990 on following substantial question of law which reads as under : "II. Admittedly when provisions of Hyderabad Rent Act came to be applicable to the area in which house is situated during the pendency of suit, Courts below failed to take into consideration the wordings of sub- section (1) of section 15 of the Hyderabad Rent Act which bars eviction of appellant even in execution of decree of civil Court ?" Smt. Dube, the learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contends that, the CIDCO was brought within the Municipal limits of Aurangabad on 3rd December, 1982. The suit was filed on 3rd November, 1982. On 3-12-1982 as the CIDCO came within the municipal limits of Aurangabad, the provisions of Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction, Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereafter referred as to the "Rent Act" for the sake of brevity) became applicable. The civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide the said suit. The learned counsel relying on section 1 of the Rent Act states that the said Act has come into force at once. The learned counsel further contends that no separate notification is required for applicability of the Act. Even if the suit premises have been subsequently included within the municipal limits, by operation of statute the Rent Act becomes applicable. The learned counsel further contends that the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation meant for protection of tenants and it shall be applicable to he pending proceedings. The learned counsel further refers to section 15(1) of trie Rent Act and submits that in view of said provision, even in execution of the decree or otherwise the tenant cannot be evicted except in accordance with provisions of section 15 of the Rent Act. As tenant cannot be evicted except as per the provisions of section 15, then the Civil Court could not get the jurisdiction to execute the decree. It is the only Rent Controller who can pass a decree of eviction, if the conditions as laid down in section 15 are satisfied. The learned counsel relying on section 31 of the Rent Act states that, even the lease determined earlier is not exempted from the operation of said Act. The learned counsel relying on section 36 of the Rent Act further submits that the proceedings initiated under the Hyderabad Rent Control Order are only saved and not proceedings under the different statute. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Hyderabad High Court in a case of Govind Rao vs. Bhagwan, reported in AIR 1956 Hyderabad 17, so also on the judgment of the Apex Court in a case of Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1596.
(3.) SHRI Lakhkar, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the lease stood determined on 5th April, 1982, when the notice of determination of lease was served upon the defendant. Even the suit was instituted prior to the suit property being included in the Municipal limits. There was no separate notification stating that the Hyderabad Rent Act is applicable to the said premises. The learned counsel further submits that the law applicable to the parties would be the law in force on the date of the institution of the suit. For the said purpose, the learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in a case of A. V. Ibrahim and another vs. Mandepanda Cariappa, reported in AIR 1971 Kant. 298. The learned counsel submits that there is nothing in the Act which states that the proceedings pending under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act shall be dealt by and under the provisions of the Rent Act. If there is no such provision, then the suit would be governed by the general statute i.e. Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of Apex Court in a case of Sardar Khan and others vs. Syed Najmul Hasan and others in Appeal (Civil) No. 1107 of 2007 decided on 28th February, 2007.;