ANZ GRINDLAYS BANK Vs. GENERAL SECRETARY GRINDLAYS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION
LAWS(BOM)-2001-1-46
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Decided on January 25,2001

ANZ GRINDLAYS BANK Appellant
VERSUS
GENERAL SECRETARY,GRINDLAYS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION Respondents

JUDGEMENT

- (1.) THE petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned Award and order dated 15-9-1999 in Reference No. CGIT-2/135 of 1998 in Industrial Dispute referred by the Government of India for adjudication of legality and justifiability of the order of termination of one Shri Deepak Mungekar, a Peon, from their employment.
(2.) THE facts are very simple. The petitioners, a giant multi national, had appointed on 19-3-1990 a workman in the sub-staff (Peon) category. He continued till 30-7-1994 continuously without any break. By an order dated 30-7-1994 his employment was discontinued on the ground that he was no longer required as additional workman. Along with the said order of termination he was given a Pay order for a sum of Rs. 92,966. 20 which included Rs. 75,049. 67, difference in wages payable to him and Rs. 21,722. 99 as Bonus. The amount of Rs. 10,725. 54 was the amount of compensation payable under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The concerned workman appears to have approached the respondent Union and the respondent Union questioned the legality and propriety of the termination order and espoused his cause and raised an industrial dispute to get him reinstated in service with full back wages and continuity of service. Both the parties filed their pleadings and adduced oral and documentary evidence. The learned Member of the Industrial Tribunal by his Award dated 15-9-1999 held that the action of the petitioners Management in terminating the service of Shri Mungekar was not legal and not justified. The Tribunal directed the petitioners to reinstate him with continuity of service and full back wages.
(3.) MRS. Mhatre, the learned Counsel for the petitioners Bank, has submitted that the workman was appointed wholly as a temporary sub-staff to brief the requirement of increase in work at that time and he was continued till 30-7-1994 when his services were terminated as the additional work was not available. According to the learned Counsel, though the order of termination mentions section 25 (f) of the Industrial Disputes Act it was not the case of retrenchment. According to her, by way of abandon precaution the workman was offered retrenchment compensation along with his other legal dues which he had accepted. Mrs. Mhatre contended that it was a simple case of employment of a sub-staff to meet the exigency of increasing work and his termination from employment after such exigency was over. She has further contended that as it was not a case of retrenchment there was no question of following section 25 (g) read with Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rules. It was a simple case of "work not available. " She further contended that though the workman was not a member of the respondent Union and though the Industrial Dispute was referred under section 2 (A) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 as "an individual dispute" the respondent Union had filed the statement of claim and its Secretary had signed the same. According to her, the respondent Union could not file the statement of claim as it was a reference under section 2 (a) as an individual dispute. She further pointed out that the concerned workman was not a member of the Union and therefore the Union could not have espoused his cause and could not have filed the statement of claim on behalf of the concerned workman. I have recorded this submission of the learned Counsel only to be rejected instantaneously being totally opposed to the letters of the Act and the spirit of the industrial jurisprudence. The Union is a complete shelter and home for retreat for every workman as and when he finds himself in difficulty. Very often the employees or workmen do not become members of any Union for their own reasons selfish or otherwise. It is possible that the present workman being only a temporary workman preferred to remain away from the Union but when he found himself in difficulty he knocked the doors of the Union which rightly gave shelter to him and responded to his call for help. The Union did not, rightly, adopt a narrow and sectarian attitude of not helping him on the ground that he was not the Union-member. The Union has rightly extended its help and has espoused his cause for justice. There is no bar or prohibition for the respondent Union functioning in the petitioners Company, or for that matter for any union functioning in any undertaking to espouse cause of any workman who might not have been enrolled as member in the past. The Membership of a Union is not a condition precedent to espouse an industrial dispute of a workman. The Union can espouse cause of even a non-member, who approaches them for help. The Union must represent a case of workmen or employees like a representative Union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, whether they are members or not. It is always in the interest of Industrial relations that even an individual workman or an employee is represented by a Union and that the cause is espoused by the Union and if the Union acts in the interest of the workmen. Section 2 (A) was introduced by the Legislature when it was found that some of the Unions did not espouse the cause of individuals and therefore such individuals were left in lurch as their cause was not espoused by the Union, and therefore, grave prejudice and injustice was done to individual workman. This amendment became necessary to meet the tyranny of some Trade Unions, which discarded the individual workman. In such circumstances a case of an individual workman was treated as an industrial dispute by section 2 (A ). It therefore does not mean that it was not capable of being espouse by the respondent Union and that the respondent Union could not espoused an industrial dispute being an individual dispute under section 2 (A) of the Act. There was nothing wrong if the respondent Union had espoused the industrial dispute under section 2 (A) of the Act and that the Secretary of the Union had filed a statement of claim on behalf of such individual workman. Mrs. Mhatre did not point out any decision or authority to show that a Union cannot espouse or appear in a cause of individual workman, whose dispute has been referred under section 2 (A) of the Act as an individual dispute which deemed to be an industrial dispute and that the Union can espouse the cause of its members only and that it cannot espouse the cause of a non-member.;


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