D.N.Mehta,J. - (1.) In this Writ Petition, the Petitioners prayed for a writ of certiorari against the Respondents for quashing and setting aside the order of requisition passed on 21-1-1955 in respect of the premises situated at Godown No. 52 on the ground floor of the building known as 'Shreepati House', situated at 143/145, Modi Street, Fort Bombay-400 001. The Petitioners also prayed for an order directing Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to withdraw or cancel the said requisition order and also to withdraw the allotment of the premises to Respondent No. 3 and to handover vecant and peaceful possession to the Petitioners.
(2.) Shri Gursehani, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, submitted that the order of requisition was passed about thirty-five years ago and the premises continued to remain under requisition and hence the order of requisition dated 21-1-1955 had assumed an air of permanence. Shri Gursehani contended that requisition in its very nature was transitory and the order could not remain in existence in perpetuity. In support of his submission, Shri Gursehani relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 866, to the effect: "But the concept of requisition involves merely taking of domain or control over property without acquiring rights of ownership' and must by its very nature be of temporary duration. If requisitioning of property could legitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, the distinction between requisition and acquisition would tend to become blurred, because in that event for all practical purposes the right to possession and enjoyment of the property which constitutes a major constituent element of the right of ownership would be vested indefinitely without any limitation of time in the requisitioning authority and it would be possible for the authority to substantially take over properly without acquiring it and paying full market value as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the government can under the guise of requisition continues for an indefinite period of time in substance acquire the property, because that would be a fraud on the power conferred on the government We must therefore held that the order of requisition even if it was valid when made, ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time. It is not necessary for us to decide what period of time may be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an order of requisition in a given case, because ultimately the answer to this question must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but there can be no doubt that whatever be the public purpose for which an order of requisition is made, the period of time for which the order of requisition may be continued cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years."
(3.) Shri Gursehani, relying on the above observations,submitted that in the instant case also the order of requisition having been passed in the year 1955, i.e., thirty-five years ago, had assumed a permanent nature and hence the same deserved to be struck down.;