- (1.) S. Harkauli, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
(2.) THE respondent No. 3 was an employee of the petitioner. He was trans ferred but he refused to comply with the transfer order and instead applied for voluntary retirement under the rules prevalent at that time. THE request for voluntary retirement was not accepted by the petitioner. THE respondent No. 3 thereupon instituted suit No. 260 of 1997 for a mandatory injunction against the defendant to reconsider the plaintiffs re quest for voluntary retirement. THE suit was decreed by the trial Court by order dated 14-8-1997 issuing mandatory in junction to the defendant for reconsider ing the request of the plaintiff for volun tary retirement. Against the decree petitioner (defendant) filed an appeal No. 58 of 1997. In the appeal defendant (ap pellant) sought an amendment. By the amendment the appellant wanted to bring on record the amendment which took place in the Rules in 1996. THE scheme of 1996 modified the earlier scheme of 1986 in respect of voluntary retirement. That amendment was rejected by the appellate Court. THE appellate Court has gone into unnecessary details. THE crux of the mat ter is that the plaintiff's request for volun tary retirement has to be considered today, provided the decree of the trial Court is upheld. Obviously the request has to be considered in accordance with the rules or the scheme which is in force today. THE petitioner cannot be directed to ig nore the present law, and decide the mat ter of voluntary retirement in accordance with old Superseded rules. THE appellate Court was therefore, entirely in error in rejecting the amendment application. THE learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has placed reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court reported in 1998 (1) ARC 2 and 1996 (7) SCC 486 for the proposi tion that no amendment should be al lowed. Normally if it has the effect of taking away the right accrued in favour of other since by admission in the pleadings. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 states that in the written statement filed by the defendant in the suit, it was admitted that 1986 scheme was applicable to the respondent No. 3 and therefore, by the present amendment that admission would be taken away and substituted by a new scheme of 1996. It is not in dispute that there is new scheme of 1996 which modified and super seded the scheme of the admission as a matter of fact and not matter of law. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has no substance. The orders dated 19-3-1998 and 14-8-1997 passed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The appellate Court shall decide the appeal expeditiously. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .;