- (1.) R. D. Shukla, J. The writ petition has been filed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 2nd February, 1999 passed in Regular Suit No. 240 of 1996, rejecting the petitioner's application 48-C under Order IV-A and Section 151, C. P. C. for consolidation of the suit with Suit No. 253 of 1996.
(2.) THE impugned order contained in Annexure-1 was passed on 2nd February, 1999 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Gonda, rejecting application 48-C for con solidation of Suit No. 253 of 1996 with Regular Suit No. 249 of 1996. Both the suits were pending in the same Court in which parties were same and the subject matter of dispute was also the same. It is also not in dispute that the matter in issue is substantially the same in both the suits. THE trial Court, however, rejected the ap plication for consolidation of suit 48-C on the ground that in view of the provisions of Section 10 there can be no consolidation of the two suits. Heard parties counsel. The dispute in the two suits relate to the same house claimed by the daughter and the daughter-in- law of one Banwari Lal. The impugned order has not con sidered this material aspect of the two suits noted above that these relate to the same property and are between the same parties, m which matter in issue was directly and substantially the same. Obviously the con solidation of the two suits shall avoid mul tiplicity of the proceedings.
(3.) SECTION 10, C. P. C. deals with the stay of suits on the ground that no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously in stituted suit between the same parties and at the same time Order IV-A of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes that when two or more suits or proceedings are pending in the same Court, and the Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice, it may by order direct their joint trial, whereupon all such suits and proceedings may be decided upon the evidence in all or any such suits or proceed ings. These two provisions were con sidered in Anandan Gupta v. Navin Agarwal and others, AIR 1984 Alld. 387. It was held that these provisions expressly em powers the trial Court to consolidate the suits if it was expedient in the interest of justice to direct a joint trial. There is no doubt that looking to the facts involved in the two suits before the trial Court, a joint trial would avoid the multiplicity of proceedings and it would be expedient in the interest of justice to have a joint trial of the two suits. In P. P. Gupta v. East Asiatic Co. Bombay, AIR 1960 Allahabad 184, it was held that Section 10 does not go to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court trying the second suit, but merely lays down a rule of procedure. The words "no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit were intended to bar the separate trial of any suit in which the matter in issue was also directly and substantially in issue in a pre viously instituted suit between the same parties in the same Court or in any other Court, as is the case of the parties in the writ petition. Section 10, C. P. C. is not in tended to take away the inherent power of the Court to consolidate in the interests of justice in appropriate cases different suits between the same parties in which the matter in issue is substantially the same. It appears that the trial Court has not been able to consider this aspects of the matter thoroughly.;