- (1.) B. K. Rathi, J. Heard Sri Apul Misra, the learned counsel for the revisionist and the learned A. G. A.
(2.) THIS revision is directed under Sec tion 397, Cr. P. C. against the order dated 15-3-99 passed by II Addl. Sessions Judge, Jhansi in S. T. No. 70 of 1996 for offence under Sections 308, 323, 325, 452, 504 I. P. C. The applicant who is accused in thic case moved an application that the charges were framed on 19-7- 1996 and the plea of applicant was recorded on that day that more than two years have passed and therefore, the evidence of the prosecution be closed. That application has been rejected by the learned trial Court. Ag grieved by it, the present revision has been preferred. The learned counsel for the ap plicant has referred to the case of Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar, reported in 1999 (1) JIC 131 (SC ). The directions were given by the Supreme Court in para 16 are material. The clause (1) is material and Section 16 and clause (i) are reproduced below: "16. After deep consideration of the mat ter, we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay's case, 1992 Jlc 218 (SC), with the following directions: (i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the ac cused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not, within the said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. " The exceptions to clause (i) are given in Clause (iv) which is as follow: (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is at tributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no Court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii ).
(3.) IN this case, it is not denied that the trial is pending since more than two years. Copyof the order sheet filed shows that the plea of the accused was recorded on 19-7-96 after framing of the charge and the trial is pending since then. The order sheet and impugned order further show on one date only, the applicant sought adjournment and therefore, the delay is not attributable to "the conduct of the accused. Even the period of one adjournment granted at the instant of applicant is excluded more than two years have already passed since the plea of the applicant was recorded. The' delay of this period is not' attributable to the applicant. On the other hand the delay took place for two reasons. Firstly, there was no presiding officer and secondly, due to the strike of the advocates. There is no such exception to clause (i) for these reasons. Clause (i) of para 16 of the judg ment of the Supreme Court is a mandatory direction and the Court is bound to follow the same. The trial therefore, has end in ignoring the said direction and the revision is fit to be allowed.;