- (1.) ALOKE Chakrabarti, J. The Respon dent No. 2, a teacher in Mahatma Gandhi Vidyalaya, Inter College Vijai Nagar Kan pur Nagar was arrested in connection with the Criminal proceeding under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code on an incident of murder of his daughter-in-law and was taken in custody on 27-2-1997. The petitioner was suspended on 14-3-1997 by the Committee of Manage ment and the same was approved by the District Inspector of Schools on 26-4-1997. But, the District Inspector of Schools cancelled the said approval order on 8-5-1997. The Committee of Manage ment passed order dated 13-5-1997 effect ing the suspension of the Respondent No. 2 until further orders. By order dated 13-10-1997 the Joint Director of Education directed payment of salary to the Respon dent No. 2. In respect of realisation of such payment, order dated 3-11-1997 was passed directing single operation of the Accounts. Four Writ Petition Nos. 19779/97, 22857/97, 34934/97 and 37355/97 were filed by the respective par ties against the aforesaid orders. Interim order was passed in Writ Petition No. 37355 of 1997 against the order directing single operation which was later on set aside in Special Appeal No. 950 of 1997. Ultimately by judgment and order dated 28-10-1998 Hon'ble S. Rafat Alam, J. decided all the aforesaid writ petition directing the District Inspector of Schools to pass a fresh order on the application of the Respondent No. 2 under sub-section (8) of Section 1-6-G of the U. P. Inter mediate Education Act after affording op portunity of hearing to the management.
(2.) IN compliance of the said order the District INspector of Schools passed impugned order dated 12-4- 1999 revoking approval to the suspension of the Respon dent No. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. P. N. Saxena, learned coun sel for the Respondent No. 2 and learned Standing Counsel. The petitioner's contention is that the provision of sub- section (8) of Section 16-G restricts consideration only to the aspect of delay and in the impugned order the said aspect has not at all been con sidered. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that in such circumstances, the impugned order is bad as it failed to comp ly with the direction of this Hon'ble Court as also the sole requirement of provision of sub-section (8) of Section 16-G. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the impugned order was passed revoking approval only on two grounds that the criminal proceeding is relating to an incident amongst the mem bers of a family and does not relate to students, teachers and guardians and the name of Respondent No. 2 was not men tioned in the initial first information report. It is contended that such grounds are not relevant for the purpose of con sidering the approval of suspension.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of stay order granted, the Respondent No. 2 did not suffer financial loss for long period and he was being paid salary under the court's order and therefore, on the ground of delay such approval could not be refused. On behalf of the Respondent No. 2 it has been contended that such criminal proceedings normally remain pending for long time and there is no justification for keeping the Respondent No. 2 under suspension so long the criminal proceed ing remains pending. It is further con tended that similar provision of suspen sion as contained in Section 16-G (5) (c) is equivalent to provision as contained in sub-rule (1-A) of Rule 49-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Ap peal) Rules as applicable in State of Uttar Pradesh and therefore, interpretation of the said provision of Rule 49-A as made in the case of Brijesh Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 348, has to be applied in the present case.;