D.K. Seth, J. - (1.) Notices were issued to the opposite parties No. 2 and 3, but neither post card nor registered card had come back.
(2.) By an order dated April 1, 1986 service of notices upon opposite parties No. 2 and 3 was deemed sufficient service under Chapter VIII Rule 12 of the Rules of the Court, but no appearance has been put in on behalf of opposite parties No. 2 and 3. Amar Jeet Kaur appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1.
(3.) Mr. Sandeep Seth, holding brief of Sri. N.K. Seth, submits that initiation of the proceeding by the Labour Court under Industrial Disputes Act against the petitioner in relation to a dispute raised by the respondent No. 2 on account of suspension of respondent No. 3 who is allegedly workman, is wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as respondent No. 3, Bank Branch Manager was performing managerial, administrative function as an executive officer of the branch to which he was the Manager. He is excluded from the definition of workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such in respect of the dispute on account of his suspension, the Labour Court cannot assume jurisdiction. Mr. Seth has relied on definition, of workman under Section 2 Clause (ii) and has pointed out from Annexure No. 5 being part of the Bank Manual which provides the duties of the Branch Manager indicating the role-summary and function of such Branch, Manager which elicits the function of the Branch Manager in a capacity of managerial and administrative nature. Having drawn my attention to the role and functions, he pointed out that the role and function of the Branch Manager is purely of managerial and administrative nature. He neither performs supervisory function nor that of workman. He also relied on decision of the case of Gouri Charan Kanoongo v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Orissa and Anr., (1978-I-LLJ- 276) (Ori-DB) and in the case of Aparna Kumar Dhar Gupta v. United Industrial Bank of India Ltd. 1979 LIC 506. On these grounds he contends that the proceeding could not proceed and it should be quashed. Further, in view of the interim order dated December 19, 1985, passed by this Court the initiation of proceedings against the respondent No. 3 in respect of the charges pursuant to which he was suspended giving rise to the instant proceedings, was stayed. According to him, this petition cannot be said to have become infructuous by reason of subsequent development in view of the suspended proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act. As soon as the interim order is vacated the proceedings relating to the alleged industrial dispute will survive. Therefore, according to him it should be decided on merit.;