S.R.SINGH, J. - (1.) Appeal on hand, stems from the judgment and order dated May 14, 1999 passed by the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner the challenge in which was focussed on the order dated October 26, 1998 passed by the Labour Commissioner, U.P. Kanpur in exercise of the power conferred by the proviso to Rule 25 (2) (v) (a) of the U.P. Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Rules, 1975.
(2.) At the very threshold, Sri Ram Niwas Singh, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent made a preliminary submission stating that the appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court was not maintainable. The quintessence of his submission is that the Labour Commissioner while exercising the power under Proviso to Rule 25 (2) (v) acts as a' Tribunal' and therefore, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge made in the writ petition wherein the order of the Labour Commissioner (Tribunal) was under challenge, would not be appealable. Sri Tarun Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant repudiated the submission made by Sri Ram Niwas Singh and urged in opposition that the Labour Commissioner could not be equated with Tribunal within the meaning of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court. For proper analytical approach to the question as to the maintainability of the appeal, it would be essential to have a bird's eye-view of the relevant provisions. Rule 5 of the Chapter VIII of the Rules of Court is excerpted below: "5. Special Appeal. An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a Tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise oi jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the concurrent list in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any Officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge.] (Sic) or similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of the establishment, the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of the workmen of the contractor shall be the same as applicable to the workmen directly employed by the principal employer of the establishment on the same or similar kind of work; Provided that in the case of any disagreement with regard to the type of work the same shall be decided by the Labour Commissioner, U.P., whose decision shall be final;" It would be apposite to quip here that Rule 25 (v) (a) of the U.P. Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Rules, 1975, is in pari materia with the corresponding provisions in the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules, 1971 with the only distinguishing feature that there, the power under the proviso is conferred upon the Chief Labour Commissioner and the expression 'whose decision shall be final' has been omitted by GSR 871(E) dated November 26, 1985 (1986-CCL-III-102). The word' Tribunal' has not been defined in the Rules of the Court. The dictionary meaning of the word' Tribunal' is: 'the seat of a Judge', and in that sense, the term would include 'Courts of law'. However the words' Tribunal' and 'Court' are used in Rule 5 of Chapter VIII, as they are in Article 136 of the Constitution, in juxtaposition with each other to mean two similar things but not the same things. The word 'Tribunal' means quasi-judicial Tribunals other than ordinary Courts, which bear some 'trappings of a Court'. All Courts are 'Tribunal' but all 'tribunals' are not necessarily 'Courts'. As held by the Supreme Court in A.C's Companies v. Chairman, AIR 1965 SC 1595 a body which determines controversies or the rights of the parties is called the 'Tribunal' when it possesses some but not all the trappings of a Court. The broad features, which characterise the 'Court', may be delineated as thus : (a) The Court is the part of hierarchy of Tribunals set up by State under its constitution in exercise of the judicial power of the State i.e. the power to decide controversies between its subjects or between it and its subjects to uphold the rights and to punish wrongs; (b) it must be recognised by the law as a Court; mere exercise of function in a judicial manner is not enough; (c) it must exercise the power to decide by reason of the sanction of law and not by the voluntary submission of the parties to its jurisdiction; (d) the Court determines the controversy objectively and impartially; (e) the Court is bound by precedent; the doctrine of res-judicata or estoppel by judgment applies to decisions of Courts, subject to certain conditions. It is a settled proposition of law that it is not possible for a Tribunal to combine in it all the virtues of a Court - See D.D. BONE on ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Chapter XI. It would be evident from the proviso to Rule 25(2) (v) of the Rules that a particular controversy is statutorily committed to the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner 'whose decision shall be final'. The decision of the Labour Commissioner is judicial rather than administrative, as he has to decide the controversy independently and impartially. Though the Labour Commissioner is not designated as 'Tribunal' but some of the 'trappings of Court' are found in the Labour Commissioner while exercising power under the proviso to Rule 25 (2) (v) of the U.P. Rules.
(3.) In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha, (1980-I-LLJ-137) (SC) a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the word "TRIBUNAL" and decide the question as to whether the word includes 'Arbitrator' under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. After noticing the definition of the word "Tribunal", as delineated in Section 2 (r) of the Act, the Supreme Court held that prima facie 'Tribunal' "is a different category from arbitrators but all statutory definitions are subject to contextual changes" and went on to hold as under : "Then what is the natural meaning of the expression "Tribunal"? A 'tribunal' literally means a seat of justice. May be, justice is dispensed by a quasi-judicial body, an arbitrator, a commission, a Court or other adjudicatory organ created by the State. All these are Tribunals and naturally the import of the word embraces an arbitration Tribunal." The Court further observed : "We have hardly any doubt that ' Tribunal' simpliciter has a sweeping signification and does not exclude 'arbitrator'.";