- (1.) YATINDRA Singh, J. One Sri Hidayat Ullah, predecessor-in- interest of respon dents 3 to 10 (the contesting respondents) Tiled an application for release of the premises in dispute under Section 21 (1 ) (a) of UP. Urban Buildings (Regula tion of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (the Act ). This application was ini tially rejected by the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter the contesting respondent filed an application which was allowed and the matter-was sent back to the Prescribed Authority for re- decision. The Prescribed Authority after remand, by his order dated 18th November, 1998 allowed the applica tion of the contesting respondents. Petitioners filed an appeal which was dis missed on 4th May, 1999, hence the present writ petition.
(2.) I have heard Sri K. K. Arora, coun sel for the petitioners and Sri Vijai Bahadur, counsel for the respondents. Sri Vijai Bahadur has slated that he does not wish to file any counter-affidavit and the writ petition may be disposed of. In view of this 1 have heard counsel for the parties on merit and this order is being passed. Sri Arora, counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding regarding the comparative hardship and appellate authority by misreading the judgment of the Prescribed Authority has held that the Prescribed Authority has recorded a finding about the comparative hardship and confirmed the judgment of the Prescribed Authority. The judgment of the appellate Court as well as Prescribed Authority is illegal on this ground. This submission made by Sri Arora is correct. The Prescribed Authority has not recorded any finding of compara tive hardship and the appellate Court has affirmed the non- existent finding of com parative hardship. In this aspect the judg ment of the Prescribed Authority dated 18-11-1988 and appellate authority dated 4th May, 1999 are both illegal and arc liable to be set aside. Sri Arora has further argued that Hidayat Ullah, predecessor- in-interest of the contesting respondents had entered into an agreement to sell the disputed premises with the petitioners and this fact has not been taken into account while recording the finding of bona fide need. Sri Arora has further argued that the Court below has recorded a finding of bonafide need placing its reliance on a Commissioner's report which was subject to objection filed by the petitioners; but the objections filed by the petitioners have-not been considered while placing its reliance on the same. I do not wish to say anything on this as the case is being sent back, the authority below may record a fresh finding on the question of bonafide need on the basis of evidence on record.
(3.) IN view of what I have stated above on the question of comparative hardship the judgment of the Prescribed Authority as well as appellate authority is illegal and the matter should have been sent back to the Prescribed Authority but as the appel late Court has power to go into the ques tion of fact, Sri Arora says instead of remanding to the Prescribed Authority the matter may be sent back to appellate Court for recording a finding of bonafide need as well as of comparative hardship. In view of this I quash the judg ment of appellate authority dated 4th May, 1999 and the matter is sent back to the appellate Court to decide the matter afresh after recording a finding of bonafide need as well as question of comparative hardship without being influenced of any observations made in this judgment. The parties will appear before the District Judge Kanpur Nagar on 6lh December, 1999 who may decide the case himself or transfer it to any other Additional District Judge except to one who has already decided the matter and has expressed his view.;