- (1.) The petitioner claims employment under the Dying in Harness Rules n account of death of his father, who was employed as permanent S.B.A. in the Kashi Sahkari Chini Mills Limited Aurai. Mr. A.K. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the extent that Dying in Harness Rules does not apply in the Kashi Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Since it was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and secondly that this writ petition is not maintainable against Kashi Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., a Cooperative Society in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of Radha Charan Sharma Vs. U.P. Cooperative Federation & others (1982 AIR All 342).
(2.) Mr. C. L. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand contends that the Cooperative Society is affiliated to the federation and that the office of the federation as well as that of the Cooperative Society are Government office and the State Government can exercise control over the affairs of the society. Therefore it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. He had relied on a decision in support of his contention, which will be dealt with at appropriate stage. I have heard both the learned counsel at length. Mr. Yadav relying on Section 2(a-4) of the Cooperative Societies Act contended that this Section 2 (a-4) includes U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd. As an apex society in serial no. 7. Therefore, writ is maintainable against it because it is a State within the meaning of Article 12. He relies on Section 3 and points out that the Registrar is appointed by the Government as Registrar of Cooperative Societies. He also relied on Section 122 under which the State Government is empowered to exercise control over the employees of the Cooperative Societies. On these grounds, he contends that this writ petition is maintainable.
(3.) In the present case, the petitioner's father was employed in the Cooperative Society, which was affiliated to the federation. Even if the federation is held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12, still then simply by affiliation, the Society cannot become State within the meaning of Article 12. Therefore the definition in Section 2 (a-4) of the said Act does not help Mr. Yadav in order to bring the concerned Cooperative Society within the ambit of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Section 3 empowering the State Government to appoint the Registrar of the Cooperative Society has nothing to do with the concerned Cooperative Societies because the Registrar of Cooperative Societies is the Registrar of All the Cooperative Societies and he altogether functions in a different capacity unrelated to the internal management and affairs with regard to its affairs of the concerned Cooperative Societies. The jurisdiction of the Registrar is prescribed and is confined to the extent as indicated in the various provisions of the Act and the Rules. By virtue thereof, no characteristics of State is conferred on the Society. Section 31-A requires appointment of certain Government Officers in the Society for the apex society ipso facto does not make the Society a State within the meaning of Article 12 unless all the ingredients as has been specified in the case of Raman Daya Ram Shetty Vs. The International Airport Authority of India (AIR 1979 SC 1628) is satisfied. In the present case the Cooperative Society does not satisfy those ingradiuns. Therefore, Section 31-A cannot help Mr. Yadav in his contention particularly when it has been held in the case of Radha Charan Sharma (Supra) by a Full Bench of this Court that the Cooperative Society is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such not emenable to writ jurisdiction. Section 122 prescribed authority on the State Government to exercise control over the employees of the Cooperative Societies by virtue whereof, U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees' (Centralised Service) Regulation, 1975 has been promulgated. In this case it has not been shown that the employees of the said Society are governed by the said 1975 Regulations. On the other hand, the employees of the said Society are governed by the Standing Orders by the notification dated 4th March, 1972. Cooperative Sugar Factories were also included within the ambit of 1975 Regulations but by subsequent notification, Cooperative Sugar Factories have been taken out of the application of the 1975 Regulations. Therefore, the 1975 Regulation as such does not apply. At the same time, Standing Order by which the employee is governed, has no statutory force as has been held in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & another Vs. Krishna Kant (AIR 1995 SC 1715). Therefore, in absence of any statutory force in the Standing Order, the condition of service in relation to the employees, the Cooperative Society does not discharge any statutory obligation in order to make it amenable to writ jurisdiction. The decision in the case of Subhash Yadav Vs. U.P. Cooperative Society & others on which Mr. Yadav had relied on, has not laid down any ratio. On the other hand, it had directed disposal of the representation in accordance with Regulation 104 of the 1975 Regulations, which does not apply in the present case. Therefore, the said decision does not help Mr. Yadav.;