JUDGEMENT
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(1.) D. K. Seth, J. Mr. Salil Kumar Rai, learned Counsel for the revisionist in this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has assailed the impugned order dated 30th August, 1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Xth Court, Gorakhpur, in S. C. C. Suit No. 9 of 1998 on the ground that the plaintiff landlady having not appeared as a witness offering to be cross-examined, the notice terminating the tenancy cannot be said to be proved in her absence only on the basis that the said notice was sought to be proved by her father. He secondly con tends that the issue with regard to the validity of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has not been considered in its proper perspective by the learned trial Court and the finding therein appears to be wholly perverse and is not a decision on a particular issue as is ap parent on the face of it. In support of his contention, he relied on the decision in the case of Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another (AIR 1927 Privy Council 230); Iswar Bhai C. Patel alias Bachu Bhai Patel v. Harihar Behera and Another (1999 SC 1341); Vidhyadharv. Mandakraoand another (AIR 1999 SC 1441) and Rambaran Pas-wan v. Smt. Kalo Dei and another (AIR 1974 Patna 333 ).
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the opposite party on the other hand contends that it is an admitted position that the plaintiff her self resides in Meghalaya, which fact was known to the defendant himself all through and that the property was being looked after on behalf of the plaintiff by her father. The rent was used to be col lected by the father and the father had proved the notice that it was issued at the instance of his daughter. He also contends that there was no specific issue framed with regard to the question as raised by Mr. Rai. Issue No. 5 which relates to the validity of the notice was decided rightly against the defendant by the learned trial Court. He then contends that this finding on the issue No. 5 is a finding of fact, which should not be gone into in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. He relies, on the decision in the case of Laxmi Kishore and Another v. Har Prasad Shukla (1981 ARC 545 ). He contends that only on the ground of notice, the finding cannot be set aside, which is purely a technical question. The suit being a suit within the scope and ambit of the Provincial Small Causes Courts' Act, it remains a summary trial, for which those questions cannot be gone into as elaborately as that by a Civil Court.
I have heard both the learned Counsel at length.
Admittedly, the plaintiff is a resi dent of Shillong and the suit property was being looked after by her father. The rela tion between the plaintiff and her father is also not in dispute that she happens to be the daughter of the person looking after the suit as her father. Order III, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes recognised agent to the extent empower ing such agent to act on behalf of a party. The expression 'act' includes all actions in the proceeding itself as agent of the party. A person can represent himself in a suit through his agent. Rule 2 (b) prescribes that a person carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties not resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the ap pearance, application or act is made or done, in matters connected with such trade or business only, where no other agent is expressly authorised to make and do such appearance, applications and acts. Thus a person can be represented through an agent if the person is not a resident within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court as in the present case. But such person shall be taken to be carrying on trade or business for and in the names of parties. Now it is to be seen as to whether collection of rent on behalf of the landlady is trade or business in the name of the landlady.
(3.) BE that as it may. We may refer to tins question at a later point of time if it is so necessary. In the present case a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued to the defendant. Section 106 of the said Act provides that every notice under the said Section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of a person giving it and either by sent by post to the parties who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to the said party or one of the agents for service at his residence. In the present case, the service of the notice has not been dis puted. It is also not disputed that the notice was signed by the pleader on behalf of the landlady. It is also admitted that the notice was in writing and that the notice was given on behalf of the landlady. The only question that has been raised is that there was no proof that the notice was issued at the instance of the landlady, since the landlady did not appear and got herself examined whereas the plaintiff had ex amined her father as a witness on her be half.
In the light of these facts, the ques tion is to be gone into. In Indian sub-con tinent the relationship between the father and daughter or the r elation in the family is well-known, to be very closely knit. It is not a case that a stranger or an outsider is dealing with the property of the plaintiff. Admittedly, the daughter is living in Shil-long, therefore, the properly is being looked after by her father. It is not a case covered within the scope and ambit of the decision in the case of Sardar Gurbaksh Singh (supra) by the Privy Council, wherein the consideration was altogether different. The ratio decided in the said case does not apply in the fads and circumstan ces of the present case. In the said case the witness was not related to the plaintiff and the matter was proceeded with the view that true object is to be achieved with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstan ces of the case can dispel the suspicious attaching to it. If the father looks after the property of the daughter, it cannot be a ground for suspicion since the father, a legal agent or custodian, is acting on behalf of the landlady or the landlord. II the father comes and deposes that he personally knows that his daughter had engaged the Counsel and instructed him. This is a mat ter which is personally known to the father and, therefore, his testimony satisfies the object of propriety for dispelling suspicion. Therefore, the said case does not help us in the facts and circumstances of the present case.;
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