R.M. Sahai, J. - (1.) Secretaries of different Societies, who are members of U. P. Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Societies Centralised Services, have challenged their suspension in consequence of First Information Reports lodged against them f; r embezzlement and have raised common questions of law touching upon not only absence of power of suspension by the authority who passed the order, legality of initiation of disciplinary proceedings during pendency of investigation and trial but also absence of certification of the regulations under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 or grant of any exemption under Section 13(b) etc.
(2.) Since factual controversy is none, the relevant facts necessary for adjudication of the legal issues shall be adverted to as and when they are taken up. Initial attack was on jurisdiction to suspend and continue disciplinary proceedings during pendency of criminal proceedings and it was urged that since both proceedings were, "grounded upon the same set of facts", they could not be continued, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kusheshwar v. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2118. The submission was advanced on complete misapprehension of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Court which despite request to, "settle the law in a straight jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting" did not "propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship and individual situations may not be met and thereby injustice is likely to ensue". What was held by Hon'ble Court was, "while there could be no legal for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case, in the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of a proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. On the facts, however, the Hon'ble Court upheld the order of trial court directing stay of disciplinary "proceedings as criminal auction and the disciplinary proceedings were grounded on same set of facts". The submission, therefore, that no disciplinary proceedings should be initiated as a matter of law during pendency of criminal proceedings is devoid of any substance. Even on facts the claim of petitioners cannot be accepted. May be that embezzlement detected in each case may have resulted in the two proceedings namely, filing of First Information Report under SectioiV409,1. P. C. and initiation of disciplinary proceedings under Centralised Service rules or regulations made thereunder. But does that alone entitle petitioners to claim stay of proceedings. No, because the cause of action for one is criminal breach of trust in respect of property entrusted to petitioners in their capacity as a public servant, whereas the occasion to initiate disciplinary proceedings was satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that proceedings contemplated were such that if proved they would result in dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. They may have arisen from same complaints or ever same set of facts but they were routed through the appropriate authorities in accordance with rules. Therefore, the circumstances in such matters do not warrant any interference and that also in equity jurisdiction. Physical assault on a superior officer by an employee in an industrial unit may not amount to misconduct and the officer discipline may stand restored by sending the accused to face trial but corruption or embezzlement of funds in government offices or public departments is a crime against society which calls for tough and hard dealing. Suspension results in temporary prevention or interruption from functioning so long the cloud cost on employees conduct is not cleared. But the danger of permitting such an employee to continue and run the risk of perpetration of similar activities which led to his suspension and destroying the office culture by encouraging others can be very grave and serious. Arbitrary action of disciplinary authority or mala fide apart this Court should be reluctant to interfere with suspension of employee for embezzlement and corruption. Apart from it sub-para (iii) of sub-clause (f) of Regulation 59 framed under Rule 30 of U. P. Agricultural Credit Society Centralised Rules (.hereinafter referred to, as Rules) empowers the authorities specified therein to suspend an employee if a complaint against him for any criminal offence was pending under police investigation for which he has been arrested.
(3.) Next attack on validity of suspension orders was lack of power in member-secretary of the District Administrative Committee, an executive authority under Rule 7(4) of the Act to pass the order as under Rule 13 of the aforesaid rule it was the District Committee which was the appointing authority of the members of the district and was entrusted with duty and responsibility of exercising control and supervision over members of the district. The submission was attempted to be supported by referring to Regulation 59(e) and (f j framed under the Rules in 1978. It was also submitted that even if Secretary of the District Committee who is District Assistant Registrar, possessed such power then the order could be passed under Rule 14(v) of the Rules only with prior concurrence of Assistant Registrar who is defined under Rule 2(e) to mean a person appointed as Assistant Registrar under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act. And since no concurrence of such authority was obtained the order was void. The learned counsel submitted that a perusal of the orders indicated that the power was exercised both as Assistant and District Registrar which was illegal as the rule having contemplated two different authorities, one passing the order and the other concurring to it, the opposite party-could not have exercised both the powers himself. Reference was made to notification No. 3328 issued by State Government on 5th July, 1969 in exercise of power under sub-section(2) of Section 3 of U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and it was submitted that the powers of the Registrar which could be exercised have been specified in clause (4) of the notification which does not specify the power of suspension, the order passed by opposite-party was invalid. It was also submitted that the order could not be treated as an order of Committee, as the Committee could function in the manner provided in the rules for which the minimum quorum was three. The learned counsel urged that regulation have not been certified under Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act not they have been granted any exemption, therefore, no action could be taken under it. Constitution of the District Administrative Committee in the District of Bahraich was also challenged because it resulted in setting at naught check and balances under Act and Rules. Attention was drawn to explanation and the order passed granting bail and it was urged that they left no room for doubt that the suspension order was arbitrary.;