B.L.Yadav - (1.) THE petitioner has challenged the order, dated 22-3- 1986 (Annexure IV) dismissing the appeal under section 33 of the U. P. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short the Act). THE reasons for the dismissal are that the petitioner did not file the appeal within thirty days as provided under section 20 (1) of the Act.
(2.) MR. K. B. L. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the appeal under section 33 of the Act could have been filed within thirty days from the date, the order of the competent authority, passed under section 20 of the Act, was communicated. In the present case, the said order was not communicated and there was no evidence to that effect, rather just by the fact that the petitioner has filed a statement, it has been inferred that the petitioner could have knowledge about the order passed under section 20. The relevant portion of the finding of the learned District Judge is set out as follows :- "It also shows that the orders were passed and then a notice was sent to his house and he again filed affidavit on 13-2-1980, in respect of his claim under section 20 of the Act. It is not acceptable that he did know about the order once he was taking proceedings under section 20 of the Act, he cannot all of a sudden say that he had no information. The ground is, therefore, insufficient." The learned District Judge has totally failed to notice the provision of section 33 of the Act. The provision of section 33 is that the person aggrieved from an order can prefer an appeal within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him. There is condition precedent before the limitation for preferring an appeal commences to run. It is, that the impugned order must have first been communicated to him, and, from the date of communication limitation for 30 days would run. The order appealed against was not communicated to the petitioner, hence there was no occasion for limitation to run. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, urged that the impugned order was correct because the delay in preferring the appeal has not been condoned and application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay has been dismissed and no sufficient ground was made out.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the parties agreed that counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavits have been filed and the petition may be decided on merits. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, 1 am of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Section 33 of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by the impugned order by the competent authority under this Act ...... may "within thirty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him" prefer an appeal to such authority as may be prescribed.;