- (1.) RAJESHWAR Singh, J. The Magistrate convicted Lalit Kishore under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for selling adulterated mustard oil and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprison ment for two years, and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,500. On an appeal the Sessions Court maintained the conviction, but reduced the sentence to rigorous imprison ment for one year and fine of Rs. 2,000. In default of payment of fine, a further imprisonment for six months was ordered. Against the judgment the present revision has been filed.
(2.) THE Chief Food Inspector took the sample of mustard oil from the revisionist. THE Public Analyst reported that it was adulterated inasmuch as 33% Tisi Oil had been mixed with it. So, the revisionist was prosecuted. THE Chief Food Inspector came in the witness-box. He proved taking of the sample and other formalities. He mentioned that the shop-keepers, who had their shops close by, were called to be witnesses of taking of the sample, but they declined. THEre is one other witness who proved that the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the revisionist by registered post. THE learned trial court and appellate court have believed these witnesses and on perusal of the evidence I find that their evidence is prefectly reliable. THE matter seems to be virtually concluded by findings of fact. However, a few observations may be made here to meet the grounds taken in this revision. While dealing with the cases of food adulteration, courts should keep in mind the future injury likely to be caused and it should be slow to quash the prosecution on mere technical irregularriaties in procedures of director nature, State of Punjab v. Devindra Kumar, (1983) 2 SCC 384. Articles of Food should conform to the standards prescribed by the Act and Rules. Ordinary vendor may not be conversant with the technicality of standards, still he is liable if he sells articles of food not conforming to the standars, J. P. Gupta v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 326. It is trite law that in food offences strict liability is the rule not merely under the Indian Act but all the world over. Section 7 casts an absolute obligation regardless of bad faith or mens rea. If one has sold any article of food contrary to any of the sub-sections of Section 7, he is guilty. There is no more argument about it, Pyarali K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange, (1974) 1 SCC 167.
(3.) IT is true that for the protection of the liberty of the citizens, in the definition of offences, blameworthy mental condition is ordinarily an ingredient either by express enhachment or clear implication, but in Acts enacted to deal with a grave social evil, or ensuring public welfare, especially in offences against public health, it is often found necessary in the larger public interest to provide for imposition of liability without proof of a guilty mind. Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchant's Association v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 71. IT is not for the prosecution in a case under the Act to show that the adulterated article of food in question was deleterious to health and if so, how much harmful effect it would have upon the health of the person consuming it. All that is required to be shown is that the article of food in question was adulterated and did not conform to the prescribed standard. Manibai v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 3 SCC 760. IT is always open to a person selling an article capable of being used as an article of food as well as for other purpose to inform the purchaser by clear notice that the article sold or supplied is not intended to be used as an article of food. Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 71. In the case before us it has not been even suggested to the Chief Food Inspector or proved by some other evidence that at the time of selling the oil, the revisionist informed that the article was not meant for being used as food. The use of the article and is not entirely irrelvant. It is to be presumed from the nature of the article itself or the circumstances and the manner of offering it for sale. Shah Ashu Jaiwant v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 2 SCC 99. In the case before us mustard oil was being sold. It is well- known that it is used as an article of food. It appears from the nature of the article itself, and when the purchaser is not informed that it is not meant for being used as food, the natural presumption would be that it was being sold for being used as food, and as stated earlier there is nothing to show that the seller gave any information that the article was not to be used as a food. It is not a rule of law that evidence of Food Inspector cannot be accepted without corroboration. The evidence of the Food Inspector alone, if believed, can be relied upon for prov ing that the samples were taken as required by law. Babu Lal Hargovind v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 1 SCC 767. A prosecution case based on the testimony of the Food Inspector alone cannot be thrown out. Prem Ballabh v. State Delhi Administration, (1977) 1 SCC 173. In the case before us there is evidence of the Chief Food Inspector that he tried to secure other witnesses, but they were not willing to come forward. It is but natural because they may be having a feeling of fraternity. The Food Inspector must call for one or more independent persons to be present at the time when sample is taken. However, regardless of all circumstances, non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would not vitiate the trial or conviction. The obligation which Section 10 (7) casts on the Food Inspector is to 'call' one or more persons to be present when he takes action. Where the Food Inspector did call the neighbour shopkeepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate, he could not certainly compel their presence. In such circum stances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent wit nesses. It is easy enough to understand that shopkeepers may feel bound by fraternal ties, but no court can countenance a conspiracy to keep out indepen dent witness in a bid to defeat the working of laws. Sri Ram Lubhaya v. Municipal Corporation, (1974) 4 SCC 491. The report of the Public Analyst under Section 13 of the Act need not contain the mode or particulars of analysis nor the test applied but should contain the result to analysis, namely, data from which it can be inferred whether the article of food was not adulterated as defined in the Act. Dhain Singh v. Municipal Board, (1969) 2 SCC 371.;