- (1.) G. B. Singh, J. This is a State appeal against the order of acuittal of Jagdish Prasad respondent, from the charge under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteteration Act passed by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Sultanpur.
(2.) THE case of the prosecution was that on 30-6-1980 R. K. Agniholri, Food Inspector, along with Madan Lal, Vaccinator, went to village Raghipur (Bhuwan Sbahpur Mela), Sultanpur, and found there that Jagdish Prasad, respon dent, was selling sweets at his shop. THE Food Inspector tried to take sample of Imarti, which was coloured one, but Jagdish Prasad did not permit him to do so. He prevented the Food Inspector from taking the sample by throwing Imanies on the ground, pushing the Food Inspector aside and crushing the Imarties by toot. THE Food Inspector wrote a report on the spot and obtained the signatures on it. When the Food Inspector enquired from Jagdish Prasad if he had any licence to sell sweetmeats he could not produce it and the Food Inspector found that he was selling them without any licence. THE Food Inspector, therefore, obtained sanction of the Chief Medical Officer and filed complaint against Jagdish Prasad for selling articles of food without licence though licence was required under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and he prevented the Food Inspector from taking a sample as authorised by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and thereby he committed offences punishable under Sections 7/16 (l) (a) (ii) and 16 (i) (c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. THE Special Magistrate (Economic Offences) found Jagdish Prasad guilty of both the offences. He convict ed and sentenced him under Section 7 read with Section 16 (l) (a) (ii) to one year's R. I. and a fine of Rs. 2000 and under Section 16 (l) (c) to one year's R. I. and a fine of Rs. 2000. It was further ordered that in case of default in payment of fine Jagdish Prasad shall undergo R. I. for one year against each fine. Against this Jagdish Prasad preferred appeal which was allowed on the ground that sanction given by the Chief Medical Officer was not duly proved. Feeling dissatis fied with this judgment the State has preferred this appeal. It was vehemently argued before me by the learned counsel for the State that sanction was duly proved by the prosecution and the judgment of the lower appellate court allowing the appeal and holding the sanction not duly proved and setting aside the conviction and sentence on this ground is not warranted by law. I find much force in this argument. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act lays down that no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Gov ernment or the State Government. It shows that before instituting the prosecution under this Act a written consent by the Central Government or a person autho rised in this behalf by either of them has to be obtained. This written consent is sometimes referred to as sanction for the prosecution. It has not been disputed before me that the Chief Medical Officer has been authorised to give the requisite consent for the prosecution for the offences under the said Act. A document purporting to be a sanction by the Chief Medical Officer/local Health Authority, dated 16-10-1980 was produced in the case by R. K Agnihotri, Food Inspector (P. W. 1) who stated that he produced the papers before the Chief Medical Officer, Sultanpur. He further stated that the Chief Medical Officer after going through the records and document put up before him gave the consent for prosecution of Jagdish Prasad. He further added that the sanction (Ext. Ka-3) bears Chief Medical Officer's signature and recognises it. It is significant to note that this statement of the Food Inspector was left uncross-examined and no question was put to him in cross-examination to elicit as to how he recognises the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer. His statement in examination-in-chief is to the effect that the Food Inspector placed the relevant papers before the Chief Medical Officer and the latter gave his consent. It is true that he did not make specific statement to the affect that the Chief Medical Officer signed in his presence but the trend of his statement is to that effect and it could be clarified in cross-examina tion. Since no question was put to the witness in this connection in cross-exami nation it can be safely said that the witness was familiar with the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and on the basis of that acquaintance he identified his signatures and the written consent was obtained by the Food Inspector by placing the material before the Chief Medical Officer.
(3.) SECTION 47 of the Evidence Act lays down that when the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the hand- writing of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. The statement of the Food Inspector is that by placing the relevant material before the Chief Medical Officer he obtained the sanction duly signed for the prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulte ration Act. His statement further indicates that in obtaining such sanctions he could be familiar with his signatures. Under these circumstances it could be said that R. K. Agnihotri, Food Inspector, was acquainted with the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and his opinion about the signature could be a relevant fact under SECTION 47 of the Evidence Act. His statament which was left uncross-examined could, therefore, be taken as a sufficient proof of the fact that sanction bears the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer, Sultanpur. The manner in which Section 47 is framed indicates that it is enough for a witness to say in examination-in-chief that he in acquainted with the hand-writ ing and that if it is desired to challenge his statement he should be cross-examined on that point to show that he could not be acquainted with the handwriting in the circumstances of a particular case. In other words, a witness need not state in the first instance how he knows a handwriting since it is the duty of the opposite party to explore in cross- examination the sources of his knowledge, if he be dissatisfied with the testimony as it stands. Since in the present case, the state-ment of R. K. Agnihotri (P. W. 1) in examination-in-chief was left unchallenged in cross-examination it cannot be said tint he was not acquainted that the signatures of the Chief Medical Officer and thus his statement cannot be received in evidence and relied upon in holding the sanction proved.;