ISWARI Vs. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION KANPUR CAMP
LAWS(ALL)-1989-12-30
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Decided on December 06,1989

ISWARI Appellant
VERSUS
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONSOLIDATION KANPUR CAMP AT HAMIRPUR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

B.L.Yadav - (1.) BY the present writ petition under Article 226 petitioner has prayed for writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 26-5-1989 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissing the revision of the petitioners and the order dated 24-4-1989 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) allowing the substitution application filed by respondents Nos. 16 and 17.
(2.) FACTUAL matrix of the case is that Bhagwan Das father of the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 and respondents Nos. 16 and 17 was dead and one Barwa father of the petitioner No. 3 and respondent No. 15 was also dead. A substitution application was filed by Man Bodhan etc. appellants in the appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) stating that in place of Bhagwan Das deceased names of his sons Ram Karan and Jai Karan may be substituted and if there are some other heirs it may be asked from the respondents to tell the name of those heirs so that they may also be substituted as heirs and impleaded as parties. In that substitution application names of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 sons of Bhagwan Das deceased and the names of the petitioner No. 3son of Barwa deceased were not mentioned. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by order dated 24-4-1989 (Annexure '6') allowed the substitution application and against that petitioners' revision failed by order dated 26-5- 1989. Against these orders present writ petition has been filed. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as the petitioners were also heirs in the sense that the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 were real brothers of the respondent Nos. 16 and 17 who were already brought on the record in place of Bhagwan Das deceased the petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 must be substituted as heirs alongwith respondents Nos. 16 and 17 and similarly Ram Bharosa was one of sons of Barwa hence he must be substituted alongwith the respondent No. 15 who is real brother and the substitution application was belated as it was filed after two years from the date of death of the deceased. It was urged that the said substitution application not containing the names of all the heirs should not have been allowed and the case abated. Having heared learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the view that the petition is devoid of merits. If the substitution application was filed by Manbodh etc. appellants in appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) (Annexure '2') indicating that the respondents Nos. 16 and 17 were sons of Bhagwan Das and respondent No. 15 was son of Barwa deceased hence they may be substituted but the names of the petitioners were not indicated as heirs of the deceased and it was indicated in the application that if there is some other heir that may be pointed out by the respondents, such substitution application is maintainable and it was allowed, the case or suit can not abate. If it is filed indicating the names of only one heir or only few of them that application cannot be said to be not maintainable or defective in any respect. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the provisions of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short the 'Act'), but the principles contained in Order 22 Rules 2 and 4 can be borrowed just to do justice between the parties. Rules 2 and 4 of Order 22 deal with the principles that where one or two or more defendants or respondents dies and the right to sue survives against the defendants or respondents an application in that behalf can be made to bring the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased on record. Only one legal representative is sufficient to represent the estate of the deceased. Law does not require more than one or all the legal representatives to be brought on record. In Other words it is not necessary in law to bring all the heirs on the record. There are catena of decisions in support of the above view. Reference may be made to a Supreme Court case (which arose from our High Court) Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, AIR 1965 SC 1049 (at page 1054). The ratio is set out as follows :- "The almost universal consensus of opinion of all the High Courts is that where a plaintiff' or an appellant after diligent and bonafide enquiry ascertains who the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondeat are and brings them on record within the time limited by law, there is no abatement of the suit or appeal that the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and that a decision obtained with them on record will bind not merely those impleaded but the entire estate including those not brought on record. The principles of this rule of law was thus explained in an early decision of the Madras High Court in Kadir Mohideen v. Muthukishna Ayyar, ILR 26 Mad. 230."
(3.) THERE are no dearth of authorities in support of aforesaid view (see Sir Sulaiman Acting C.J. in Muhammad Zafaryab Khan v. Abdul Razzak Khan, AIR 1928 Alld. 532, Sadulla Khan v. Bismilla Bai Sadruddin AIR 1924 Bom. 420, Lilosoner v. Jhagru Sahu, AIR 1925 Pat. 123). It was next urged that the substitution application was time barred by two years. During the consolidation operation rights of the parties are finally adjudicated upon. Just after notification under section 4 of the Act, the parties are required to file their objections within 21 days otherwise consequences indicated under section 11-A would accrue. The consolidation authorities or the court is required to be guided by the rule of justice. All rules of justice are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice, and are accordingly, imperative that these rules or procedure are made to serve the ends of justice. With this in mind if the delay in filing the substitution application has been condoned with a short order that itself is sufficient for the ends of justice and the substitution application has correctly been allowed. It has to be kept in mind that corresponding to the provisions of Rule 4.(2) of Order XX (Twenty) of the Code indicating contempt of a judgment of court other than Small Cause Courts or Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code (providing contempts of judgment of the Appellate Court) there is no provision under the Act or the Rules. It cannot therefore, be asserted that the order condoning the delay was not in confirmity with any form of order or judgment provided.;


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