B.N. Misra, J. - (1.) U.P. State Road Transport Corporation has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing the order, dated June 12, 1985 (Annexure-3) passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, v. Lucknow, whereby the order, dated March 10, 1977 , passed by the petitioner terminating the services of respondent No.2 was set aside the respondent No.2 was held entitled to full pay, allowances with increments and other service benefits including the benefit of continuity of service and back wages.
(2.) The facts may be briefly stated. Respondent No.2 was working as a Conductor under the petitioner Corporation. According to the petitioner, respondent No.2 was appointed on December 7, 1965 although in his claim petitioner respondent No.2 had claimed that he was appointed on March 10, 1965. Respondent No.2 had also claimed that his appointment was against a clear vacancy and that he had been confirmed on the post of Conductor. The petitioner's stand in this regard is that respondent No.2 was working in a temporary capacity as a Conductor till March 10, 1977 and had not been confirmed. According to the petitioner, on an overall assessment of the work and conduct of respondent Not it was found that his services were not satisfactory. His services were accordingly terminated by as simple order of termination, dated March 10, 1977 (Annexure 1) on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. The order of termination was passed by the Assistant Regional Manager who was the appointing authority and as such competent to pass the order of termination. Thereafter, having failed to secure any relief from the departmental authorities, respondent No.2 filed a claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal, respondent No. I. The claim of respondent No.2 is that the impugned order terminating his services was not an innocuous order but had been passed by way of punishment on the ground of misconduct and as such without a proper departmental enquiry his services could not have been terminated. Parties had appeared before the Tribunal and filed written statements in support of their respective cases. The main question which arose for consideration before the Tribunal was whether the impugned order of termination, dated March 10, 1977, was an order of termination simpliciter or was an order of punishment on the ground of respondent No. 2's misconduct which had provided the foundation for the said order. After considering the respective cases of the parties and taking into consideration several decisions on the question, the Tribunal came to hold that the foundation for the impugned order of termination was the misconduct of respondent No.2 for which he could be suitably punished by way of dismissal or removal from service by following the correct procedure, but that it was not open to the Corporation to terminate his services by the so called simple order of termination. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the impugned order of termination, dated March 10, 1977, and directed that respondent No.2 should be deemed to be in continuous service and entitled to full pay, allowances with increments and all service benefits including arrears of salary.
(3.) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has challenged the findings and the decision of the Tribunal mainly on the ground that the Tribunal failed to maintain the distinction between 'motive' and 'foundation'. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has, on the other hand, submitted that the alleged misconduct of respondent No.2 on December 19, 1976 was the foundation of the impugned order and, therefore, since respondent No.2 was not given any opportunity to explain his conduct with regard to the incident which took place on December 19, 1976, the order of terminating his services on the basis of that incident is bad in law.;