N.N.Mithal - (1.) ORDERS passed in proceedings initiated under section 24-B of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 are under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) PETITIONER is a tenant of a building in Nevada Colony, Allahabad for the last more than 20 years. It was purchased by respondent no. 4 who is the wife of respondent no. 3 on 9-6-1986. The respondent no. 3, husband of the landlady, was, at that time, Senior Civil Engineer, Railway Electrification at Allahabad and was residing with his family in a Railway flat belonging to the Railway Administration at Allahabad. After his wife had purchased the disputed building, respondent no. 3 was served with a notice to vacate the Railway flat. Consequently, the respondent no. 4 made an application under section 24-B for recovery of immediate possession of the building. The application was opposed on several grounds but ultimately the same was allowed on 10-10- 198,8. A revision by the petitioner was dismissed on 18-1-1989. It is these two orders which are being assailed by the petitioner. In a three progged attack, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the ground that it was passed by an officer who had no delegated authority from the District Magistrate, that the landlord was not the person by whom the petitioner was let in and, therefore, section 24-B could not be availed of by him and that section 21 (1) (a) and section 24-B provide for different procedures and as such they are discriminatory in nature. None of these submissions, however, has any merit. As to the first contention, it may be stated that the District Magistrate delegated his authority under section 3 (c) of the Act to Sri S. K. Sharma vide Annexure RA 1 in supersession of a earlier orders of delegation. By this order the ADM was delegated authority in respect of sector 1 of the city where admittedly the disputed premises is situate. By Annexure RA II dated 19-9-1988 the District Magistrate again delegated his authority in respect of sector 1 to the ADM (Finance and Revenue) and in respect of some other area to ADM (Civil Supplies). By a further order passed on 3 11-1988 (Annexure RA III) Sri S. K. Sharma, ADM was delegated authority in respect of sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5 also in addition to sector 1. The submission made by the petitioner was that by subsequent delegation, the earlier delegation had been withdrawn. A reading of these orders does not show any such intention inasmuch as the order dated 17-9-1988 is prefaced with an expression that the order is in supersession of an earlier orders of delegation of authority, but no such expression is used in any subsequent order. Apart from this, by order dated 19-9-1988 the District Magistrate merely purported to authorise one more officer with powers of the District Magistrate without derogation to the power conferred in favour of Sri S. K. Sharma earlier.
(3.) COMING now to the second ground of challenge, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that section 24-B applies only in respect of those landlords who had initially let out the premises to the tenant. He laid emphasis on the use of the expression let out by him occurring in that section to support his argument. The argument, in my opinion, is totally misconceived. This expression in fact refers to the landlord who has been ousted from public building in his occupation on account of the fact that he owns a building in the same city either in his name or in the name of any of his family members. The above expression, therefore, cannot be limited only in respect of those landlords who had first let in the tenant. It has to be read in a broader sense j and will include even those landlords who may have come to acquire the property subsequently, but at the relevant time a relationship of landlord and tenant must be in existence between the parties. The last argument of the learned counsel was that section 24-B and section 21 (1) (a) both are concerned with eviction of tenant from a public building and since different procedures have been provided i. e. summary procedure for the former and regular procedure for the latter, therefore, section 24-B was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Here also the learned counsel is on wrong premise. Section 21 (1) (a) deals with a tenant occupying a public building while section 24-B deals with a landlord who has been ousted from a public building Besides this section 21 (1) (a) applies when the landlord on account of cessation of his employment needs the building in occupation of the tenant while section 24-B applies when the landlord has been ousted from a public building while still in employment merely on account of the fact that he owns a building in the same city. The two provisions, therefore, cover different situation altogether and, therefore, different considerations would apply. In such circumstances if in one case summary procedure has been provided and in another case fulfledged enquiry has been made necessary, the same cannot be said to be discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.;