Gopi Nath, J. - (1.) This is a landlords application in revision from a revisional order passed by the District Judge, Lalitpur dated 2-3-1977 dismissing their suit for ejectment of the defendants.
(2.) The plaintiffs were the landlords of the premises in suit which were leased out to one Madanlal in pursuance of an allotment order passed in his favour. According to the plaintiffs, the premises in suit were let out for running a shop for repair of guns, and subsequently the same were used for working a lathe machine. Thus, the premises, according to the plaintiffs, were used for a purpose inconsistent with one for which the same were originally let out. Madanlals tenancy was determined by the plaintiffs by a notice dated 16-7-1973. It appears that he died on 20-8-1973. His heirs having failed to vacate the premises, the instant suit was filed against them for their ejectment and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation. The defence delivered was that the premises had not been used for a purpose inconsistent with the one for which the same were let out. The premises were subject to the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, and the defendants were, accordingly, entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that Act, and since no case was made out against the defendants under Section 20 (2) (d), the suit could not be decreed. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the premises were not used either by Madanlal or his heirs for a purpose other than the one for which the same were let out, and since the building was governed by the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972, the suit could not be decreed for the eviction of the defendants. As no rent was found due from the defendants, the suit was dismissed in toto. On revision the Court below concurred with the findings recorded by the trial court, and affirmed its decree. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have come up in revision.
(3.) The only question canvassed by the learned counsel for the applicants was that Madanlal being a statutory tenant of the premises in dispute, his heirs did not inherit the tenancy rights, and Mandanlals tenancy having been determined by a valid notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants were liable to ejectment by the suit. Thus the question falling for determination is whether the defendants inherited the tenancy rights of Madanlal, and could be constituted as tenants of the premises in dispute after Mandanlals death. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that since Madanlal occupied the premises in pursuance of an allotment order passed in his favour, he was a mere statutory tenant, and was not a contractual tenant, whose tenancy could devolve on his heirs after his death. A statutory tenant, it was urged, is not a tenant in the eye of law, and he does not acquire the status of a contractual tenant, on whose death the tenancy rights could devolve on his heirs. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on Keeves v. Dean, (1924) 1 KB 685 ; Carter v. S. U. Carburetter Co., (1942) 2 KB 288 ; Baker v. Turner, (1950) AC 401 and J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 . In Keeves v. Dean (supra) it was held that the right of a statutory tenant under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920, is merely a personal right to retain possession of the premises, and it cannot be assigned to another person. At p. 690 of the report it was observed that"........... His right is a purely personal one, and as such, unless the statute expressly authorises him to pass it on to another person, ceases the moment he parts with the possession or dies". Scrutton L. J. while referring to the objection raised by Bankes L. J. to a statutory tenant being called a tenant, observed at page 694 of the report as follows. "My Lord has objected to his being called by that name, on the ground that he is not a tenant at all. But it is a convenient expression, and, although it is true that before the passing of these Acts no one would have spoken of a person who after the expiry of his tenancy remained in possession against the will of his landlord as a tenant, Parliament has certainly called him a tenant, and he appears to me to have something more than a personal right against his landlord/' The statute under consideration in that case was found not to have authorised the tenant to pass on his interest to another person. The case of Carter v. S. U. Carburetter Com. (supra) was concerned with the fixation of standard rent and the liability of a limited company in regard to its ejectment and payment of rent. The phrase statutory tenancy was explained as meaning a right to retain possession by a lessee in view of the protection granted by a statute. In that connection an observation was made that a statutory tenant has merely a personal right of occupation by virtue of the protection granted by an Act under which his eviction is prohibited so long as the conditions under that Act are not fulfilled and he goes on paying the stipulated rent. In the case of Baker v. Turner (supra) it was observed at page 436 of the report that "It has long been settled that the Rent Acts do not prevent an owner from terminating the tenancy of his tenant in the ordinary way: what they do is to give to a person who has been tenant a right to remain in possession after the tenancy has gone. A person with such a right is commonly called a statutory tenant." In the case of J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon (supra) it was held that "a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant" He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be fumed out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The question for consideration in this case was whether the defence of want of bona fide requirement by the landlord was a defence personal to the statutory tenant, or whether 011 his death, the same was open to his legal representative as well. It was held that under the general law the heirs of a statutory tenant were not entitled to the protection afforded to him under the statute, and since under the Act the rights of the statutory tenants were not heritable, the pleas open to him under the statute were not open to his heirs and legal representatives. It was observed that in the definition of the word tenant given in S. 3 (vii) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. 17 of 1950), the heirs of a statutory tenant were not included, and since they did not fall within any part of the definition of word tenant under that Act, they could not in their own right claim to be tenants within the meaning of the Act, and claim the protection of the same.;