Murlidhar, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant's Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the appellate order dated 5- 10-1978 of the Additional District Judge arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of U. P. Act 13 of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) by which the appellate authority rejected the petitioner's application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning 85 days' delay in filing the appeal and consequently also rejected the appeal as time barred. The brief relevant facts are these: The respondent landlady's appli cation under Section 21 of the Act was admitted to have been moved in April 1976. It was decided ex parte on 31-3-1978. THIS order of the Prescribed Authority is a brief one saying that there was no one to oppose the application and, therefore, the un rebutted affidavit in support of the landlady's application had to be believed and the need of the landlady was bonafide. The petitioner moved for setting aside of this ex-parte order on 1-4- 1978 under Rule 22 (b) of the rules framed under the Act but this application was again dismissed for default on 6-6-1978. He then moved on 13-6-1978 under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the earlier restoration application. THIS was dismissed on merits on 21-7-1978. Thereafter the petitioner secured a certified copy of the order dated 31-3-1978 and filed the appeal on 25-7-1978. The District Judge's findings for holding that there was no sufficient cause for the delay may be summarized as follows:- (1) The reason given in the initial restoration application that the petitioner reached the Court two hours late on account of some accident in which a boy was involved was suspect and the petitioner had cleverly avoided to give the time of the accident and the name of the boy involved in the accident and that if this version was true the restoration application would have been moved on the same day, (2) the reason for absence on 6-6-1978, namely, that 6th June and 13th June 1978 both dates were fixed was disbelieved by the Prescribed Authority on merits per his order dated 21-7-1978, (3) the petitioner had not shown that he acted on the wrong advice of a counsel in not filing an appeal. There was an averment to this effect in application nor was the affidavit of any counsel to this effect filed. (4) the petitioner's conduct had also been of a kind that favoured the view that he was adopting dilatory tactics. Thus in an earlier suit for arrears of rent, service on him had to be effected by publication. A second suit for arrears of rent also had to be filed against him. From these facts the learned District Judge inferred that the petitioner had not acted bona fide and had not been free from negligence. Referring to the contention that the time taken in restoration proceedings under order 9, Rule 13 Civil Procedure Code should be excluded as a matter of course, the learned Judge referred to Rajendra Nath v. Kamal Krishna A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 558 and Jotiba Limbaji v, Ramappa Jotiba1938 (40) Bom. L. R. 957 but felt that as the restoration application had not been dismissed on merits these authorities were not applicable to the present case. He went on to observe that even if it be assumed that the time spent in prosecuting the restoration application was to be excluded, the further time spent in the prosecution of the application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code could not be excluded. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that the finding that the petitioner had not been bona fide pursuing the restoration application and the application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code was unsustainable. Reliance has been placed on Hiralal v. Jhunnilal A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 540 which was also cited before the appellate authority to stress that sufficient cause should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The correct principle, however, is laid down in Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 in which it was observed that by the expiry of the period of limitation the decree-holder is entitled to the benefit of the law of limitation and this should not be light heartedly disturbed. Further that if sufficient cause for excusing the delay is shown the Court should exercise its discretion upon principles which are well understood and in this connection the word 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance justice when no negligence or inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The Supreme Court observed that while exercising this discretion the Court has to consider all relevant facts and at this stage the diligence of the party or its bona fides also fall for consideration though the scope of enquiry of these ingredients under Section 5, Limitation Act, is more limited than when the case is under Section 14, Limitation Act, where these terms have been specifically used. THIS means that lack of bona fides or due diligence can be legitimately taken to be grounds for refusing condonation of delay under Section 5. Now the findings of the appellate authority above noted clearly show that it was of the view that the petitioner had not shown due diligence and had not been prosecuting the restoration proceedings bona fide. It was contended that the conduct of the petitioner in the previous two suits was irrelevant for these proceedings. Even if these factors are excluded the remaining factors are sufficient to sustain the general findings of lack of due diligence and bona fides. In fact it would seem that the appellate authority has not properly interpreted Rajendra Nath v. Kamal Krishna and Jotiba Limbaji v. Ramappa Jotiba, (supra). In the former case the view taken following an earlier decision of the Court was that when an appellant elects to take proceedings for setting aside an ex parte decree and fails on the merits in an application which he makes for that purpose, he cannot be allowed to fall back upon the remedy which was open to him at the time when the original decree was passed and of which he did not choose to avail himself and that recourse to proceedings taken as aforesaid was not a sufficient case within the meaning of Section 5, Limitation Act. for not presenting the appeal within time. The Court repelled the argument that the Privy Council decision in Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram,(5) by which the time spent in a review application was held excludable should on a parity of reasoning lead to exclusion of time spent in restoration application also. The appellate authority in the present case misinterpreted this decision in thinking that it was not applicable to the present case because the restoration application had not been dismissed on merits but in default. Actually the words 'on merits' have been used in contrast with a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature which is pertinent to Section 14, Limitation Act. THIS is shown by the following observation in Rajendra Nath' case (supra): - ".........If an application for setting aside an ex parte decree is refused en the merits it is very different from a case where the application fails for want of jurisdiction or other causes of a like nature." In Jotiba Limbaji v. Ramippa Jotiba, (supra) it was clearly held that when it was open to the applicant to prefer an appeal against the ex parte decree on merits the time taken in proceedings for getting the ex parte decree set aside would not be excluded under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, these two decisions as a matter of law go to support the view taken by the appellate authority. The suggestion in the District Judge's judgment that these decisions may not apply to the case of a restoration application dismissed for default and the distinction sought to be drawn by him between the time taken in a restoration application and the time spent over the subsequent 151 Civil Procedure Code application do not, however, appeal to me. The result is that the impugned order has not been shown to suffer from any infirmity that can be taken notice of in these proceedings. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The stay order dated 18-10-1978 is vacated but the petitioner is granted four months' time to vacate the premises where after the order shall be executable. No order as to costs.;