R.N. Singh, B.D. Agarwal, JJ. - (1.) THE petitioner was appointed as Principal of Sri Krishna Intermediate College, Budaun. He was initially appointed on probation for a period of one year, which period was later extended by a further period of one year. During this extended period, the petitioner was suspended by the Managing Committee of the college. A charge-sheet was sent to the petitioner. Enquiry was held ex parte. THE Enquiry Committee submitted its report and found the peti tioner guilty and it made a recommendation that his service be terminated with effect from the date of his suspension. Consequent to this recommendation the Managing Committee resolved to terminate the petitioner's services. THE approval of the District Inspector of Schools was sought. THE District Inspec tor of School after considering the petitioner's reply, disapproved the proposal of the Managing Committee for termination of the petitioner's services. THE petitioner was thereafter reinstated as Principal of the College. An appeal against disapproval of the District Inspector of Schools was filed by the Mana ging Committee before the Deputy Director of Education III Region, Bareilly. Both the College as well as the petitioner appeared before the Deputy Director of Education and the matter was heard in detail. THE Deputy Director of Education by his order dated December 29, 1973 allowed the appeal of the Management and granted approval to the proposed termination of services of the petitioner. It is this order in appeal passed by the Deputy Director of Education, III Region Bareilly, which has been impugned in the present writ petition. Shri S. B. Saran learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of the Deputy Director of Education is vitiated in law as he has not recorded any reasons while setting aside the order of the District Inspector of Schools. THE Deputy Director of Education acts as a quasi judicial autho rity while hearing appeals; as such he is under a legal obligation to record reasons. Failure to do that would vitiate the order. We have gone through the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Education. After referring to the case of the parties, he has merely disposed of the matter in a few sentences without giving reasons for the conclu sions arrived at by him. He has stated that the Principal did not perform his functions with the caution as is required of a Head of the Institution. Though the charges of corruption were doubtful, yet the irregularities were proved. On this basis, he allowed the appeal. THE Deputy Director of Education has given no indication in his order as to which of the irregularities alleged against the petitioner stood proved. This was necessary to be stated by him in his order before he could allow the appeal, particularly when he found that the charges of corruption were not proved. Grant of approval to the propos ed termination of a Principal is a matter of great consequence and hence it was all the more incumbent upon him to have clearly stated as to which irregul arities were proved. In all 20 charges had been framed against the petitioner and he had submitted a detailed reply in respect of all the charges. THE District Inspector of Schools before whom the matter was hotly contested dealt with each charge separately, giving detailed reasons. THE Deputy Director of Education while setting aside the order of the District Inspector of Schools should have recorded reasons which impelled him to take a different view. THE Deputy Director of Education, who was acting in a quasi judicial capacity, was bound to give reasons for the conclusions arrived at by him. It is well settled that the authorities acting quasi judicially are bound to give reasons in support of their orders, and, absence of reasons vitiates their orders. This is a basic principle of natural justice and this rule must be conserved in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. THE Supreme Court as well as this Court has been repeatedly insisting upon this requirement. It is only in this way that opinions or decisions can be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. Very recently the Supreme Court in R. D. Shetti v. National Air Port Authority (1979(3)8. C.C. 439) has again insisted upon this requirement. It is also now well settled that conclusions cannot take the place of reasons for arriving at those conclusions. THE reasons are grounds upon which conclusions are arrived at. By merely stating its conclusions, the autho rities cannot absolve themselves of the requirement of giving reasons. In Union of India v. M. L. Kapoor (A.I.R. 1974 S. C. 87.), the Supreme Court observed that thus "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. THEy disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision." In the view that we have taken, the order of the Deputy Director of Edu cation dated December 29, 1973 cannot be sustained, and the writ petition is liable to be allowed. We allow the writ petition and quash the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated December 29, 1973. We further direct the Deputy Director of Education, III Region, Bareilly to hear and decide the appeal in accordance with law at an early date. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.;