V.N. Varma, J. - (1.) THIS revision is directed against an order dated 1 -9 -1976 passed by Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, discharging the opposite parties Illam Singh, Mahendra Singh, Lal Singh and Surender Singh in a case under Sections 302/201 IPC.
(2.) THE opposite parties had been committed to stand their trial in the court of Session under Sections 302/201 IPC. When the case was opened in the court of the learned Sessions Judge by the public prosecutor, a plea was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that there was not sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial against them and they should, therefore, be discharged in accordance with Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge accepted their plea and discharged them by the impugned order. The complainant has come up in revision to assail the order aforesaid. I have heard the teamed counsel for the parties at sufficient length and have also perused the impugned order dated 1 -9 -1976. Under Section 226 of the Code, the public prosecutor, while opening the case for the prosecution, has to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of accused. Then comes the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submission of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together, it would be clear that at the initial stage of the trial, the troth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. It is not necessary for the Judge at that stage to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or the trial is sure to end in conviction. If there is even a strong suspicion against the accused which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not Open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In the instant case, on the material present on record it cannot be said that there was not even a strong suspicion that the opposite parties have not committed the crime. The impugned order itself shows that while on 27 -3 -1976 at about 7 P.M. the deceased had been sitting at his gher in the company of the complainant and four other persons, namely, Ruda Singh, Mahender, Gyan Singh and Man Chand, the opposite parties came there and took away the deceased saying that they wanted to have some talks with him. Thereafter, the deceased was never seen alive. After about three days the dead body of the deceased was recovered from a well near the village. The allegation is that the shirt of the deceased had been recovered from a field at the pointing out of one of the opposite parties, namely, Ilam Singh. Prima facie, these facts do go to raise suspicion against the opposite parties in regard to the murder of the deceased. It is only at the time of the trial that the Court would be in a position to say whether the allegations made against the opposite parties are correct or not. The Court cannot prejudge the matter at this stage. Therefore, seeing the facts as they stood, it was not proper on the part of the learned Sessions Judge to have discharged the opposite parties under Section 227 Cr PC. The order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is definitely unsustainable and it cannot, therefore, be allowed to stand.
(3.) IN the result, I allow the revision, set aside the impugned order and direct that appropriate charge or charges shall be framed against the opposite parties and the trial shall proceed further in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that anything which I have said in support of this order will in no way prejudice the case of either party at the trial.;