K. C. Agrawal, J. - (1.) THIS writ petition has been preferred against an award of the Labour Court, Allahabad, dated 8th July, 1978. The con cerned employees, who were eleven in number, had been employed on perma nent basis in the erstwhile U. P. Government Roadways. Their terms and conditions of service were governed by the Rules and Regulations appli cable to Government servants. By a notification issued under Section 3 of Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, on 31-5-1972, U. P. State Road Transport Corporation was esta blished. The U. P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') succeeded to the assets and the liabilities of the erst while U. P. Government Roadways. A separate notification, issued on 15-7-1972, provided that the administrative powers delegated by the State Government to the Transport Commissioner and other officers subordinate to him immediately prior to 1st June, 1972, shall be continued to be vested in and exercised by the General Manager and other officers of the Corporation. By Government Order No, 3000/XXX-2-170-N/72, dated 7-6-1972, as amended by Notification No. 3414/XXX-2-170-N/72, dated 5th July, 1972, the services of the employees working in the U. P. Government Roadways were loaned to the Corporation. In other words, the employees of U. P. Government Roadways were sent on deputation to the Corporation. As stated above, the eleven employees, with whom we are concerned in the present case, were the Government employees on deputation with the Corporation. On 12th June, 1976 the Assistant Regional Manager, U. P, State Road Transport Corporation, Varansi passed an order under Fundamental Rule 56-C retiring the aforesaid eleven persons from service. Fundamental Rule 56-C entitled the appointing authority to retire a Government servant in public interest on attaining the age of 50 years. Thereupon, U. P. Roadways Em ployees Union, Jagatganj, Varanasi, which is a Union of Workmen of the Corporation, raised an industrial dispute challenging the validity of the orders retiring the aforesaid eleven persons. Being of the opinion that an industrial dispute existed, the State Government referred the following dispute for ad judication to the Labour Court, Allahabad. The Corporation filed a written statement justifying the compulsory retirement of the eleven employees on the ground that since their retention in service was not in public interest, action had been lawfully taken against them under Fundamental Rule 56-C. It was alleged that the amendment made in Fundamental Rule 56 by U. P. Fundamental Rules 56 (Amendment and Vali dation Ordinance) 1975 (U. P. Ordinance 14 of 1975), entitles the Government to retire a Government servant who has attained the age of 50 years in public interest without assigning any reason, after giving him Corporation claimed that in exercise of the aforesaid power the workmen had been retired. In the written statement filed on behalf of the workmen, the allegations were two-fold. The first was that as the eleven concerned employees on deputation with the Corporation, and that they continued to be the servants of the Government, the Assistant Regional Manager, who was the functionary of the Corporation had no power to retire them. The workmen claimed that the disciplinary action OF any other action terminating their services could only be taken by the State Government or its functionary empowered to do so. The other plea was that as the Standing Orders framed for the Corpo ration did not provide for the compulsory retirement the action taken was illegal. On these pleadings, various issues were framed. By an award dated 28th July, 1978, subsequently published on 28th August, 1978, the Labour Court quashed the order of termination of services of the aforesaid eleven persons and directed their reinstatement. Against this order, the present writ petition has been preferred. The only controversy involved in the present case is whether the order of retirement made by the Assistant Regional Manager under Fundamental Rule 56-C was valid. It is admitted case of the parties that the workmen concerned were the permanent employees of the State Government and that they had been sent on deputation with the Corporation. The Corporation however, claimed that since it had not framed its own rules under Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, the Fundamental Rules applied, and, as such in exercise of the powers conferred by Fundamental Rule 56-C., the authority equivalent to the appointing authority of the workmen could terminate their services. In this connection, it may be noted that the Corporation, established under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, has a separate and independent identity of its own. It is not a part of the Government and has a separate existence from that of the State Government. The ownership, control and management of the Corporation vest in the Corporation itself. Its employees work under the control of the authorities appointed under the Road Transport Corporations Act. The authorities or officers of the Corpo ration cannot be treated as the officers of the State Government. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Income Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1486 it was claimed by the Corporation before the Supreme Court that it was owned and managed by the State Government and, therefore, its income must be deemed to be the income of the State and should, therefore, be exempt from taxation. In this connection, the learned Chief Justice observed: "The Corporation, though statutory, has a personality of its own and its personality is distinct from that of the State or other shareholders. It cannot be said that a shareholder owns the property with which the Corporation is concerned. The doctrine that a Corporation has a separate legal identity of its own is so firmly rooted in our notions derives from Common law that it is hardly necessary to deal with it elaborately, and so, prima facie the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity cannot be claimed by the State which is one of the shareholders of the Corporation." Although the above observations were made in connection with the liability to pay income tax, but they indicate that the Corporation has its own personality, and that the same should not be considered as a part of the Government. It is a different identity from that of the U. P. Government Roadways, which was a Department of the State. For what we have said above, it may not mean that a Corporation could not be a successor of the Roadways, but being a successor did not entitle it to claim that it was a part of the Government. In Proful Kumar v. Calcutta S. T. Corporation, A I.R. 1963 Cal. 116 a Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the employees of the Corpora tion do not hold Civil posts under the Union or the State. In this background, the question of validity of the retirement order may be examined. The order was sought to be supported by the learned counsel appearing for the corporation on the basis of the directions which had been issued by the State Government under Section 34 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. The directions relied upon had been filed as Annexures and '2' to the writ petition. Annexure '' was issued by the Governor on 30-6-1972 to confer on the Corporation power to enable it to do its management. The relevant clause on which emphasis had been laid by the counsel for the petitioner Corporation was; "The administrative and financial powers delegated by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Transport Commissioner, U. P., and other officers subordinate to him immediately prior to 1st June, 1972, shall be continued to be vested in and exercised by the General Manager and other officers of the Corporation to the same extent in each case as here to before and similar duties, responsibilities and functions shall continue to be perfor med by them as they have been performing so far." Placing reliance of the aforesaid clause, counsel contended that disciplinary power since was included within the "administrative powers" conferred by, the aforesaid Government order, the workmen could be retired in exercise of the said powers. The submission maze is not correct. We have already noted above that the employees were on deputation. They had not been absorbed in the service of the Corporation and continued to be the servant of the State of U P. By the aforesaid order, the State Government did cot transfer the power of termination of services of the Government servants sent on deputation to the Corporation. The fact that the employees had been sent on deputation indicated that action such as disciplinary action or termi nation of service by compulsorily retiring them could be taken only by the State Government. There is nothing in the aforesaid notification which could entitle the Corporation, to terminate the services of these employees. The establishment of the Corporation did not mean that the services of the employees of U. P. Government Roadways were automatically transferred to the Corporation or that those employees automatically became the emplo yees of the Corporation as from 1st of June, 1972. It, therefore, appears to us that even if Fundamental Rule 56-C applied, the action of compulsory retirement against the concerned employees on having attained the age of 50 years could not be taken by the Assistant Regional Manager of the Corpora tion He has no authority to do so. Counsel next invited our attention to Annexure '2' and contended that since the Assistant Regional Manager was an authority equivalent to the Assistant General Manager, the powers conferred on the Assistant General Manager were exercisable by him. There is nothing in this annexure either which entitles the Corporation to compulsorily retire the employees. Counsel for the respondents also urged that since the Standing Orders framed for the workmen of the Corporation did not provide for the compul sory retirement on attaining the age of 50 years, the orders made were illegal. There is a dispute between the parties with regard to the existence of Standing Orders which applied to the concerned workmen. The workmen failed to bring to our notice the Standing Orders and, as such, we cannot accept the argument suggested by their counsel. For what we have said above, we are unable to find that the award suffers from any mistake apparent on the face of the record requiring inter ference. Since, in the instant case, the appointing authority of the concerned workmen was different than the authority terminating their services, the termination orders could not be sustained and were rightly set aside by the Labour Court. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Respondent 3 would be entitled to get costs of this petition from the petitioner.;