K. C. Agrawal, J. - (1.) THIS is a tenant's writ petition filed against a judgment of the IVth Additional District Judge, Nainital dated 13-P-1978 dismissing an appeal preferred under Section 22 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Shrimati Maqbool Begum, respondent No. 2 filed two applications before the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, one against Kishan Chand Pandey and the other against Nandaballabh Gururani, the petitioner, for release of the two sets of buildings. The case set up by the respondent No. 2 was that she was living in a tenanted room measuring 10 ft. by 12 ft. and that there were 13 members in her family. She alleged that she required the accommodation occupied by these two tenants for occu pation by herself and her family members. The application was resisted by both the tenants. Before the Prescribed Authority, the parties led evidence and filed affi davits. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the respondent No. 2 was bonafide but as he was of the opinion that the need could be satisfied by evicting one of the two tenants, he granted the application as against the petitioner but rejected the same against K. C. Pandey. Petitioner took the matter in appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Hence this writ petition. The first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the finding given by the Courts below about the bona fide requirement of the premises by respondent No. 3 was illegal inasmuch as the respondent No. 2 had not been able to bring evidence on record to prove the same. The submission made is untenable. Respondent No. 2 had filed affidavits and other evidence and had established that there were as many as 13 members in her family. Respondent No. 2 had also shown that there was only one room in her possession. From these facts, it could reasonably be found that the need of respondent No. 2 was bona fide. The Second ground was about the comparative hardship. The two Courts below concurrently found that comparative hardship likely to be caused from the rejection of the application to respondent No. 2 is greater. The finding is a finding of fact and it also cannot be set aside. The last submission was that the application made by respondent No. 2 was not maintainable, In support of this submission, learned counsel con tended that respondent No. 2 had purchased the house on 11-11-1974 and had the application for release against respondent No. 3 within three years of the said purchase and, as such, the application was barred by the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21. It would be found from the said proviso that no application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21 (I) unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase. The proviso therefore, lays down that an application will not be entertained for 3 years. THIS necessitates us to find out the meaning of the word "entertain". The dictionary meaning of the word "entertain" is 'admit to consideration' and, therefore, the Court cannot refuse to take the application simply because it is filed within 3 years. What is required to be seen is that if an application is made within 3 years after the commencement of the Act, the same cannot be admitted to hearing within 3 years. The word 'entertain' does not mean either 'receive' or 'accept', It means proceed to consider on merit or adjudicate upon. That being so, the submission made is not tenable. In MIS. Lakhsmiratan Engineering Works v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales-Tax AIR 1968 SC 488, the Supreme Court was called upon to deal with the scope of the expression 'entertain' used in Section 9 of the U. P. Sales-Tax Act. It Jays down that the word "entertain" does not mean the date of the filing of the appeal. It means the date on which the appeal comes to be heard on merit. Taking this view of the matter, the Supreme Court found that if the tax had been deposited even before or on the date of hearing, the appeal could not be rejected on the ground that the same was defective. In my view, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case would apply squarely to the present case. In Kundan Lal v. Jagannath Sharma AIR 1962 Alld. 547, this Court was considering the scope of the expression "entertain'" occurring in Order 21, Rule 90 C. P. C. Dealing with the word, 'entertain' the Division Bench held that the word, 'entertain' does not have the same meaning as the filing of the application or admission of the application by the Court. A similar view had been expres sed in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta AIR 1962 Alld. 543. Attempt was, however, made by the learned counsel to show that the authorities referred to above may not be relied upon for interpreting the pro viso and the word, 'entertain' used in the first proviso to sub- section (2) of Section 21 inasmuch as the taking of that meaning would defeat the object of the proviso. I do not find any merit in this submission. The object of the proviso appears to be which has been explained by me in Ram Autar Gupta v. Hoshiyar Singh 1978 (4) ALR 895. In my opinion, the said object of preventing the eviction of the tenant is not defeated by accepting an application filed within three years. If, of course, an application is allowed, within the period of three years, it may be said that the object is likely to be defeated. It may be pointed out here that in the case of Ram Autar Gupta (supra) the appli cation had been allowed by the Prescribed Authority within three years of the making of the purchase of the building by the landlord. In the instant case, the purchase was made on 11-11-1974 and the application had been allowed on 22nd July, 1978. The present case is thus distinguishable on facts. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The petitioner is granted four months time to vacate the premises. There shall be no order, as to costs.;