R.M.Sahai, J. - (1.) With change in the office of Gaon Sabha Jageshwar Singh either due to personal malice against the petitioner for contesting election against him or motivated by sense of public duty filed a miscellaneous application on 1-11-1973 before the Consolidation Officer after a lapse of nine years, since finalisation of chaks, for inquiry and correction of revenue records which the petitioner was alleged to have got manipulated with connivance of consolidation staff. It did not find favour and was dismissed on 14-9-74 on the ground that the village had been denotified under Section 52 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Another attempt was made on 23rd October 1974 but with no better result. Having failed twice before the Consolidation Officer revisional jurisditcion under Section 48 was invoked against the second order dated 5-4-1975 but the revisional authority felt helpless as the first order was permitted to have become final and second application was filed after nearly nine months of denotification on 6th January 1974. In review the Deputy Director held that there being no provision for review the application was not maintainable but in exercise of suo motu powers he directed the Consolidation Officer to decide the application for correction on merits.
(2.) Suo motu power is an aspect of revisional power conferred on the Deputy Director under Section 48 of the Act. Its scope and ambit does not travel beyond the powers of examining the legality and propriety of the order passed by subordinate authority. As the power is to correct the error of subordinate authority the Deputy Director could in the exercise of suo motu power also do the same thing. The conferment of suo motu power on the Deputy Director is not peculiar to the Consolidation of Holdings Act.
(3.) It is very common and is normally found in statutes dealing with special subject, for instance, Section 10 of U. P. Sales Tax Act, Section 264 of Income-tax Act. The purpose obviously is to clothe such an authority with ample powers to effectuate the objective of passing 'such order as it thinks fit. The power however cannot be equated with residuary power or supervening power as the learned counsel for the opposite party attempted to suggest. The Legislature has even refrained from conferring power of review. If an order passed by the Deputy Director cannot be reopened it is doubtful if it can be done in exercise of suo motu power. It would be permitting him to do indirectly which he could not do directly. The power of review and exercise of suo motu power are different and independent. They cover entirely different field. In the review proceedings against the order dated 5-4-76 the Deputy Director asked the Assistant Consolidation Officer to submit a report. The report was submitted after inspecting the record in the Munsifs court where a suit for injunction in respect of some plots is pending. How could the Deputy Director obtain fresh material in review proceedings is difficult to understand. The learned counsel argued that the Deputy Director while exercising suo motu power did not touch the order passed in revisional jurisdiction but he has set aside the first order of the Consolidation Officer passed on 14-9-74 and this he could do. The argument is attractive but suffers from a fallacy. It is admitted that the first application to reopen was rejected, may be on an incorrect basis that the village had been denotified but the question is could the Deputy Director revive the proceedings in exercise of suo motu power even after the dismissal of the second application for precisely the same relief and after its finality from the revisional authority. The second application was to review the order dated 14-9-1974 and reopen. The scope, therefore, of the second application was narrow, and in any case, it was continuation of the first. The finality of the proceedings in respect of the second application resulted in the finality of the first as well.;