M.P.Mehrotra, J. - (1.) This petition arises out of the proceedings under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 960.
(2.) The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner No. 1 Jujhar Singh was issued the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act and he filed his objections. The objections were decided by the Prescribed Authority. Thereafter, an. appeal was filed and the same was heard and decided by the Additional District Judge, Jhansi. Now the petitioners have come up in the instant writ petition, and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Yotindra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners.
(3.) A contention has been raised in the petition that the sale-deed dated 14th September, 1970 should have been accepted. In my view the said contention. cannot be accepted in the writ jurisdiction of this court. The authorities below have given their reasons for ignoring the said document. I am not exercising the appellate jurisdiction, and the finding of fact recorded by the authorities below cannot be interfered with. The learned counsel for the petitioner emphasises certain observations made in the Division, Bench pronouncement of this court in Yadunath v. State (1979 All WC 187) . It should be seen that in the said case the Division, Bench clearly held that the Ceiling authorities were entitled to look into the validity of the transfer deeds which were executed before 24-1-1971. The Division Bench emphasises the approach of a prudent person in the matter of appreciating the evidence. In this connection the Division Bench referred to Section 3 of the Evidence Act. In paragraph 14 the Division Bench observed as under:- "He may discharge that burden by producing before the Prescribed Authority the copy of the registered sale-deed showing that he had for some consideration, transferred the plots to a third party before 8-6-1973. In such a case unless there is something else on the record that a prudent man would act on the supposition that title to the plot covered by the sale-deed was, before 8-6-1973 transferred to the third party and the person to whom the notice was issued, had ceased to hold the same." It must be emphasised that it will be utterly wrong to interpret the authority of Yadunaths case in a rigid manner. The basic position is that under the ceiling law the Prescribed Authority and thereafter, the District Judge have been constituted final authorities in the matter of deciding findings &i facts. It is important that under Section 13 (2) of the Act the decision of the District Judge, has been made final and conclusive and not to be questioned in any court of law. This provision clearly emphasised the anxiety of the legislature that the judgment of the District Judge should not toe questioned in any manner. It is not suggested that this court is bound by or inhibited in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 'Constitution of India, it is permissible to take the said provision, into consideration showing the legislative anxiety. In AIR 1964 SC 477 Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishna it was held (at pp. 479-480):- "There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings..... ...... ......It may be conceded that it would have been better if the Appellate Tribunal had indicated why it rejected the case of respondent No. 1. in regard to his alleged workshop at Chidambaran, but we do not think that the failure of the appellate Tribunal to give a reason in that behalf, or to refer specifically to the evidence adduced by respondent No. 1 would, by itself, constitute such an error in its decision, as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari under Article 226." It should be seen that in the instant case the sale-deed was made in favour of the own son and grand sons. The Division Bench in Yadunath Singhs case emphasised that if the sale-deed was in favour of a third party then a prudent man in the absence of other circumstances may believe that the deed is a genuine one. Even, on the said observations of the Division Bench, this document cannot be catalogued as one which the Division Bench had in contemplation. I would again like to emphasise that the Division Bench merely laid down certain broad guidelines and indicated certain approaches but whether a deed should be ignored or should be accepted, is basically a finding of fact and the same cannot be decided on the basis of precedents but will be dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Learned counsel then emphasises certain, observations made in paragraph 20 of the said Division Bench judgment but they were made with reference to gift-deed. Here we are concerned with a sale-deed which had been purported to have been executed for consideration. The learned counsel emphasise that the mutation had been effected in, pursuance of the sale-deed. Even if that be so, that does not rule out the application of Explanation to Section 5 (1) of the Act. It is obvious that the anxiety of the legislature is that mere execution of documents followed by mutation in the revenue records should not be decisive in the matter. If that were so, then it would be impossible to implement and effectuate the Ceiling Law. I, therefore, cannot agree with the contention that because mutation had been effected, therefore, the enquiry was shut out in respect of the real nature and genuineness of the document concerned.;